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Executive Summary 
Under the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), standardized test 
scores are the indicator used to hold schools and school districts accountable for student 
achievement.  Each state is responsible for constructing an accountability system, 
attaching consequences—or stakes—for student performance.  The theory of action 
implied by this accountability program is that the pressure of high-stakes testing will 
increase student achievement.  But this study finds that pressure created by high-stakes 
testing has had almost no important influence on student academic performance.   
To measure the impact of high-stakes testing pressure on achievement and to 
account for the differences in testing pressure among the states, researchers created the 
Pressure Rating Index (PRI).  The PRI was used in two ways.  Correlations between the 
PRI and National Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP) results from 1990 to 
2003 in 25 states were analyzed and the PRI was used in replications of previous 
research.  These analyses revealed that: 
 ii
• States with greater proportions of minority students implement accountability 
systems that exert greater pressure.  This suggests that any problems 
associated with high-stakes testing will disproportionately affect America's 
minority students.  
• High-stakes testing pressure is negatively associated with the likelihood that 
eighth and tenth graders will move into 12th grade.  Study results suggest that 
increases in testing pressure are related to larger numbers of students being 
held back or dropping out of school.   
• Increased testing pressure produced no gains in NAEP reading scores at the 
fourth- or eighth-grade levels.   
• Prior increases in testing pressure were weakly linked to subsequent increases 
in NAEP math achievement at the fourth-grade level.  This finding emerged 
for all ethnic subgroups, and it did not exist prior to 1996.  While the authors 
believe a causal link exists between earlier pressure increases and later fourth-
grade math achievement increases, they also point out that math in the 
primary grades is far more standardized across the country than the math 
curriculum in middle school and, therefore, drilling students and teaching to 
the test could have played a role in this increase.  This interpretation is 
supported by the lack of evidence that earlier pressure increases produced 
later achievement increases for eighth-grade math achievement or for fourth- 
and eighth-grade reading achievement.   
 iii
The authors conclude that there is no convincing evidence that the pressure 
associated with high-stakes testing leads to any important benefits for students’ 
achievement.  They call for a moratorium on policies that force the public education 
system to rely on high-stakes testing.  
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Introduction 
 Supporters of the practice of high-stakes testing believe that the quality of 
American education can be vastly improved by introducing a system of rewards and 
sanctions for students’ academic performance.1  When faced with large incentives and 
threatening punishments, administrators, teachers, and students, it is believed, will take 
schooling more seriously and work harder to obtain rewards and avoid humiliating 
punishments.  But educators and researchers have argued that serious problems 
accompany the introduction of high-stakes testing.  Measurement specialists oppose high-
stakes testing because using a single indicator of competence to make important decisions 
about individuals or schools violates the professional standards of the measurement 
community.2  Other critics worry that the unintended effects of high-stakes testing not 
only threaten the validity of test scores, but also lead to “perverse”3 and “corrupt” 
educational practice.4  Teachers report that the pressure of doing well on a test seriously 
compromises instructional practice.5  And still others worry that the exaggerated pressure 
on students and teachers to focus on test preparation is thwarting teachers’ intentions to 
care for students’ needs apart from those that lead to the scores they receive on 
examinations.6  It is also argued by many that the measurement systems we currently 
have cannot support the demands of those who make educational policy.7 
 The assumption embedded in the current promotion of a high-stakes 
accountability model of education is that students and teachers need to work harder and 
that by pressuring them with the threat of sanctions and enticing them with financial 
incentives, they would expend more effort and time on academic pursuits, and thus 
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learning would increase.  This rationale is problematic for several reasons.  Learning is a 
complicated endeavor and as most educators would argue, extrinsic rewards alone cannot 
overcome the range of background experiences and individual differences in learning and 
motivation students bring to school.8  Still, with significant bipartisan support, the 
passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001 instantiated this notion of 
academic accountability in education—at least for now.  But, is it working?  Does the 
threat of rewards and sanctions increase achievement?    
 Although the literature on the mostly harmful and unintended effects of high-
stakes testing is growing rapidly,9 existing research on the relationship between high-
stakes testing and its intended impact on achievement is mixed and inconclusive.  Some 
studies find no evidence that high-stakes testing impacts achievement.10  Others argue 
that the data for or against are not sufficiently robust to reject outright the use of high-
stakes testing for increasing achievement.11  And others report mixed effects, finding 
high-stakes testing to be beneficial for certain student groups but not others.12 
 One potential explanation for the mixed conclusions about the effectiveness of 
high-stakes testing on achievement could lie in measurement differences in the 
characterization of a high-stakes testing state (i.e., which states truly have high-stakes and 
which only appear to have them?).  Some researchers study the issue using a two-group 
comparison—analyzing achievement trends in states with high-stakes testing policies 
against those without.13  Others have studied the issue by rating states along a continuum 
of low- to high-stakes state (i.e., a low-stakes state has fewer consequences for low 
performance than a high-stakes state).  As more states implement high-stakes testing, the 
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rating measurement approach becomes more important than the two-group comparison 
approach.  Exploring new measurement methods is one goal of this report.  
This study adds to the literature in two important ways.  First, we employ 
qualitative and quantitative methods to measure the pressure on teachers, students, and 
parents exerted by a “high-stakes testing” system.  An examination of the research on 
accountability implementation both before and after NCLB was signed into law 
uncovered the inadequacies of existing measurement approaches for capturing the range 
of pressures that high-stakes testing exerted on students and educators or at the very least, 
they showed little agreement from one study to the next.  Thus, a significant goal of this 
study is to create a more valid system for measuring the pressure that high-stakes testing 
systems apply to educators and their students.  Our second goal is to use this newly 
created rating system to conduct a series of analyses to examine whether the practice of 
high-stakes testing increases achievement.  This is addressed in two ways.  First, findings 
from research by Carnoy and Loeb14 (whose recent report concluded that strength of a 
state’s accountability model is related to math achievement gains, specifically for 
minority students and for eighth graders), are challenged.  This research replicates their 
analyses, but replaces their high-stakes pressure index with ours.  Second, a series of 
analyses to investigate the relationship between high-stakes testing implementation and 
achievement trends over time are computed.  
Why High-Stakes Testing? 
The publication of A Nation at Risk15 alarmed citizens with its claim that the 
American public education system was failing.  As the report noted, it was believed that 
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if the education system did not receive a major overhaul, our economic security would be 
severely compromised.  American culture has internalized this claim to such a degree that 
questions about how to solve this “crisis” continue to be at the top of many policy 
makers’ agendas.  Although our education system is not as bad off as some would have 
the public believe,16 the rhetoric of a failing education system has led to a series of 
initiatives that have transformed the role and function of the American public school 
system.  High-stakes testing holds a prominent place in this transformation.  
The earliest and most common form of high-stakes testing was the practice of 
attaching consequences to high school graduation exams (i.e., students had to pass a test 
to receive a high school diploma).  New York’s Regents examinations served this 
purpose for over 100 years17 and states such as Florida, Alabama, Nevada, and Virginia 
had instituted high-stakes graduation exams at least as far back as the early to mid 
1980s.18  But in the years since A Nation at Risk, the rhetoric of high expectations, 
accountability, and ensuring that all students—especially those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds—have an equal opportunity to receive quality education has been 
accompanied by a series of federal initiatives including Clinton’s 1994 re-authorization 
of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary School Act, subsequent education “policy 
summits,” and George H. W. Bush’s Goals 2000.  In combination, these initiatives have 
progressively increased the demands on teachers and their students and have laid the 
groundwork for what was to come next—an unprecedented federal intervention on state-
level education policy making19 that directs all states toward a single goal (i.e., 100 
percent of students reaching “proficiency”) via a single system of implementation (i.e., 
standards-based assessment and accountability).  
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No Child Left Behind: Changing the Landscape of Accountability 
The construction and passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) occurred 
under the leadership of Rod Paige and George W. Bush.  In Texas, in the decade before 
they went to Washington, Bush as governor and Paige as superintendent of Houston 
school district had built and implemented a controversial high-stakes accountability 
system that placed increasing demands and expectations on students for well over a 
decade.  And while other states were also implementing accountability systems 
(Kentucky and New York among others), Texas’s “success” of holding students and 
educators accountable for learning was quite visible.  Although the “myth” of Texas’s 
success has been critically examined and documented,20 it was too late (or more likely, no 
one paid close attention) and NCLB, influenced by the programs implemented in Texas 
and elsewhere was passed in 2001 and signed into law on January 8, 2002.21  
The goal of NCLB was ambitious—to bring all students up to a level of academic 
“proficiency” within a 15-year period.  As of the day it was signed into law, states had to 
initiate a strategic plan for meeting the range of assessment and accountability provisions 
the law mandated.  States that did not were threatened by the loss of billions in Title I 
funding (see Table 1 for an overview of the law’s major mandates).  At the core of these 
mandates is that states adopt a system of accountability defined by sanctions and rewards 
that would be applied to schools, teachers, and students in the event they did not meet 
pre-defined achievement goals (see Table 2 for an outline of NCLB-defined rewards and 
sanctions).  
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Table 1: Overview of Requirements for States Under NCLB 
1. All states must identify a set of academic standards for core subject areas at each 
grade level;  
2. States must create a state assessment system to monitor student progress toward 
meeting these state-defined standards;  
3. States must require schools and districts to publish report cards identifying 
academic achievement of its students in aggregate and disaggregated by ethnicity 
and other sub groups (e.g., for racial minorities, students for whom English is a 
Second Language (ESL) and special education students); 
4. States must create a system of labels that communicate to the community how local 
schools and districts are performing;  
5. States must create a plan (i.e., Adequate Yearly Progress or AYP) that would ensure 
100 percent of its students will reach academic proficiency by the year 2014-2015; 
and   
6. States must come up with a system of accountability that includes rewards and 
sanctions to schools, educators, and students that are tied to whether they meet 
state’s goals outlined in the AYP plan.  
Source: No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001 § 1001, 20 U.S.C.  § 6301. Retrieved February 18, 
2005, from: http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/107-110.pdf 
 
 
The law is massive and forces states to allocate significant resources in the form 
of time, energy, and especially money towards its implementation—implementation that 
has been especially cumbersome22 if not potentially counterproductive to the goals of 
schooling.23  Most states were not ready to comply with the range of demands from 
NCLB.  Some didn’t have any sort of assessment system in place, whereas others were 
just beginning to pilot theirs.  Similarly, some states were already holding students and 
their teachers accountable, whereas others had no plans or intentions of doing so.  The 
demands associated with NCLB have caused problems and challenges for many states.  
In the first two to three years of implementation, most states have experienced significant 
financial and logistical barriers in implementing two of the primary accountability 
provisions stipulated under NCLB:  provision of supplementary services and allowing 
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students to transfer out of “under performing” schools.24  And, in many cases, the 
demands of the law have been met with negativity by those it arguably impacts the 
most—teachers.25  Ultimately, the pace at which states are able to enact and implement 
the range of accountability provisions outlined by NCLB varies a great deal.  It is this 
incredible range of accountability implementation that makes the study of high-stakes 
testing impact more complicated, but it is this complexity that is addressed by this study.  
Table 2: NCLB Sanction and Reward Guidelines  
Sanctions 
1. Schools failing to meet adequate yearly progress (AYP) for two consecutive years 
must be identified as needing improvement.  Technical assistance is to be provided  
and public school choice offered; 
2. Schools failing to meet AYP for three years must offer pupils from low-income 
families the opportunity to receive instruction from supplemental services, (plus 
corrective actions in #1 above); 
3. Schools failing to meet AYP for four consecutive years must take one of the 
following specified “corrective actions.” 
a. Replacing school staff, appointing outside expert to advise school, extend 
school day or year, change school internal organization structure (plus 
corrective actions in 1 and 2 above). 
4. Schools that fail to meet AYP for five consecutive years must be “restructured.” 
Such restructures must consist of one or more of the following actions: 
a. reopening as a charter school, replacing all or most school staff, state 
takeover or school operations (if permitted under state law), or other major 
restructuring of school governance (plus 1-3 above). 
Rewards  
1. States must develop strategies related to high performing schools, or those 
showing improvement such as: 
a.    Academic achievement Awards:  Receiving recognition when they close the 
achievement gap; or when they exceed AYP for two consecutive years. 
b.    “Distinguished schools” designations: identifying those schools that have 
made the greatest gains as “models” for low-performing schools. 
2. Financial awards to teachers in schools that have made the greatest gains. 
Source: No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001 § 1001, 20 U.S.C.  § 6301. Available online, accessed 
February 18, 2005, from, http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/107-110.pdf 
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High-Stakes Testing and Achievement 
 A series of studies have emerged attempting to examine the effects of high-stakes 
testing on student achievement.  Amrein and Berliner, Rosenshine, and Braun26 debated 
the merits of high-stakes testing for improving achievement, often locating their 
conflicting conclusions in the statistical analyses they applied.  Amrein and Berliner used 
time trend analysis to study the effectiveness of high-stakes testing on achievement at 
both the K-8 and high school levels.  They analyzed achievement trends across time in 
high-stakes testing states against a national average.  Their extensive and descriptive set 
of results are organized by state for which they noted whether there was “strong” or 
“weak” evidence to suggest whether achievement had “increased” or “decreased” in 
fourth- and eighth-grade National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores in 
math and reading.  They concluded that “no consistent effects across states were noted.  
Scores seemed to go up or down in random pattern after high-stakes test were introduced, 
indicating no consistent state effects as a function of high-stakes testing policy.”27  
In a reanalysis of the data addressing what were viewed as flaws in Amrein and 
Berliner’s method and design—namely a lack of control group—Rosenshine found that 
average NAEP increases were greater in states with high-stakes testing polices than those 
in a control group of states without.  Still, when he disaggregated the results by state, 
Rosenshine concluded that “although attaching accountability to statewide tests worked 
well in some high-stakes states it was not an effective policy in all states.”28  Again, no 
consistent effect was found.   
In a follow-up response to Rosenshine, Amrein-Beardsley and Berliner 29 adopted 
his research method using a control group to examine NAEP trends over time, but they 
Page 9 of 336 
This document is available on the Great Lakes Center website at: http://www.greatlakescenter.org 
 
 
also included in their analysis NAEP exclusion rates.30  They concluded that although 
states with high-stakes tests seemed to outperform those without high-stakes tests on the 
fourth grade math NAEP exams, when controlling for exclusion rates, they found that 
this difference disappeared.  They argued NAEP achievement in high-stakes testing states 
is likely to be inflated by the exclusion of greater numbers of lower achieving students. 
Braun also critiqued Amrein and Berliner on methodological grounds.  In his 
analysis of fourth- and eighth-grade math achievement (he did not look at reading) across 
the early 1990s, he found that when standard error estimates are included in the analyses, 
NAEP gains were greater in states with high-stakes testing than in those without, in spite 
of exclusion rate differences.  He concludes, “The strength of the association between 
states’ gains and a measure of the general accountability efforts in the states is greater in 
the eighth grade than in the fourth.”31  However, in a separate analysis following cohorts 
of students (1992 fourth-grade math and 1996 eighth-grade math; 1996 fourth-grade math 
and 2000 eighth-grade math), he found that high-stakes testing effects largely 
disappeared.  As students progress through school, there is no difference in achievement 
trends between states with high-stakes testing and those without.  His conclusions about 
usefulness of high-stakes testing as a widespread policy are tentative.  “With the data 
available, there is no basis for rejecting the inference that the introduction of high-stakes 
testing for accountability is associated with gains in NAEP mathematics achievement 
through the 1990s.”32  
 Carnoy and Loeb provide yet another set of analyses to describe the impact of 
high-stakes testing using a completely different approach for measuring accountability 
and focusing on effects by student ethnicity.  In contrast to others who adopted Amrein 
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and Berliner’s initial categorization, Carnoy and Loeb operationalize “high-stakes 
testing” in terms of the “strength” of the accountability in each state, rating each state on 
a 5-point scale to perform a series of regression analyses.  Their analysis leads them to 
conclude that accountability strength is significantly related to math achievement gains 
among eighth graders, especially for African American and Hispanic students.  
Carnoy and Loeb also consider the relationship between students’ grade-to-grade 
progression rates with strength of accountability.  Others have argued that high-stakes 
testing influences a greater number of students, especially minority students, to drop out 
of school.33  Carnoy and Loeb found no relationships between accountability strength and 
student progression rates. 
Conclusions From the Research 
To date there is no consistent evidence that high-stakes testing works to increase 
achievement.  Although data suggest the possibility that high-stakes testing affects math 
achievement—especially among eighth graders and for some sub-groups of students—the 
findings simply are not sufficiently consistent to make the stronger claim that math 
learning is benefited by high-stakes testing pressure.  Part of the concern is that it cannot 
be determined definitively whether achievement gains on state assessments are real or 
whether they are the outcome of increased practice and teaching to the test.  That is why 
National Assessment of Educational Progress or other measures of student learning are 
needed.  Thus, in spite of the claims of some who seem to argue that the benefits of high-
stakes testing are well established,34 it appears that more empirical studies are needed to 
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determine whether high-stakes testing has the intended effect of increasing student 
learning.   
Measuring High-Stakes Testing Pressure  
 In this section, we describe our approach to measuring high-stakes testing 
pressure.  Previous researchers studying the relationship between high-stakes testing 
pressure and achievement have differed significantly in their categorization of states with 
respect to the pressure on teachers and students exerted by the accountability programs. 
This section begins with a brief overview of existing systems followed by a detailed 
overview of the methods adopted to measure pressure across our study states.  
Existing Systems 
Amrein and Berliner studied high-stakes testing impact by identifying the timing 
and nature of each state’s high-stakes policies and comparing their achievement trends 
against a national average.  Others following Amrein and Berliner’s categorization of 
high- versus low-stakes states conducted “cleaner” two group comparisons to study 
achievement patterns in high-stakes testing states against those without high-stakes 
testing systems.35  But, the rapidly increasing number of states joining the list of those 
with high-stakes testing—and the implementation of No Child Left Behind (NCLB)—has 
made a two-group design far less useful.  
Other approaches characterize accountability implementation and impact with a 
numerical index, rating states along a continuum that is defined by some aspect of 
accountability.  Swanson and Stevenson36 crafted an index of “policy activism” that 
measured the degree to which states were implementing any one of 22 possible state 
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policy activities related to standards-based assessment and accountability.  These 22 
activities were organized into four categories:  (a) content standards, (b) performance 
standards, (c) aligned assessments, and (d) professional standards.  States received one of 
three scores across all 22 possible policy activities (0=does not have a policy, 
1=developing one, and 2=has enacted such a policy as of 1996) yielding a state-level 
index of overall “policy activism” (scale ranged from -1.61 to 2.46).  Swanson and 
Stevenson’s index measures the relative amount of standards-based reform activity as of 
2001. 
Carnoy and Loeb created an index-like system, but one that measured each state’s 
accountability “strength.”  They noted, “The 0-5 scale captures degrees of state external 
pressure on schools to improve student achievement according to state-defined 
performance criteria.”37  Thus, their index was crafted to represent a hypothetical degree 
of “pressure” on teachers and students to perform well on state tests.  This pressure is 
based on (a) the grades in which students were tested, (b) school accountability, (c) 
repercussions for schools, (d) strength of repercussions for schools, (e) if there is a high 
school exit test (in 2000), and if so, the grade at which first high school test is given, and 
(f) the first class that had to pass the test to get a diploma (all information based on data 
as of 1999-2000).38  Although they provide a general description of what each index 
value represents, their overall rationale is vague.  For example, to receive the highest 
strength of accountability score they note, “States receiving a 5 had to have students 
tested in several different grades, schools sanctioned or rewarded based on student test 
scores, and a high school minimum competency test required for graduation.  Other states 
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had some of these elements, but not others.”39  Carnoy and Loeb provide very little 
information as to how they differentiated a 5 score versus a 4 score and so on.  
Lastly, researchers from Boston College came up with a three by three matrix of 
accountability where one dimension is defined by the severity of the consequences to 
students (high, moderate, low) and the other by the severity of consequences to teachers, 
schools, and districts (again, high, moderate, or low).40  Each state receives one of nine 
possible characterizations to describe overall amount of pressure as it relates to adults 
versus students (H/H, L/L, etc.).  Nominal representations were transposed into an 
ordinal-like rating to calculate possible overlap among the existing systems for measuring 
high-stakes pressure. 
The ratings assigned by the various systems of Amrein and Berliner, Swanson and 
Stevenson, Pedulla et al., and Carnoy and Loeb are displayed in Table 3 followed by a 
table of correlations (Table 4).  Note that Amrein and Berliner’s rating was based on the 
number of stakes identified in their initial report.41  Carnoy and Loeb (in a cautious 
acknowledgement of the ambiguities in any rating scale) assigned two different ratings 
for four states (California, Maryland, New Mexico, and New York).  Both rating scales 
are included here.  The Boston College classification was converted into two numerical 
classification systems.  The Education Commission of the States (ECS)42 rating system 
was based on a tally of the number of potential sanctions on the law books as of 2001.43   
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Table 3:  Outline of Existing Rating Systems 
 
Amrein 
& 
Berliner 
Policy 
Activism 
Carnoy 
1 
Carnoy 
2 
Boston 
Rating 1*
Boston 
Rating 2** ECS 
Alabama 4 2.195 4 4 4 9 4 
Alaska 0 -0.949 1 1 4 6 0 
Arizona 0 -0.395 2 2 2 6 2 
Arkansas 0 -0.270 1 1 1 8 1 
California 5 0.090 4 2 4 9 2 
Colorado 5 0.662 1 1 3 7 7 
Connecticut 0 1.290 1 1 1 8 1 
Delaware 6 0.206 1 1 5 9 2 
Florida 5 -0.268 5 5 5 9 3 
Georgia 1 0.660 2 2 3 9 3 
Hawaii 0 0.320 1 1 1 4 1 
Idaho 0 -0.268 1 1 3 3 0 
Illinois 0 0.320 2.5 2.5 4 8 5 
Indiana 4 0.899 3 3 5 9 2 
Iowa 0 -1.606 0 0 1 1 3 
Kansas 0 0.320 1 1 3 7 5 
Kentucky 4 1.970 4 4 4 7 4 
Louisiana  5 -0.030 3 3 3 9 3 
Maine 0 1.290 1 1 1 7 1 
Maryland 5 2.460 4 5 4 9 5 
Massachusetts 3 0.320 2 2 4 9 2 
Michigan 5 0.434 1 1 4 8 3 
Minnesota 1 -0.395 2 2 4 6 1 
Mississippi 2 0.550 3 3 3 9 3 
Missouri 1 1.020 1.5 1.5 1 7 1 
Montana 0 -1.261 1 1 2 4 0 
Nebraska 0 -1.606 0 0 2 7 0 
Nevada 4 0.320 1.5 1.5 5 9 2 
New Hampshire  0 1.153 1 1 2 4 0 
New Jersey 3 -0.395 5 5 5 9 2 
New Mexico 5 0.780 4 5 4 9 4 
New York  4 0.090 5 2 5 9 2 
North Carolina 6 1.600 5 5 5 9 5 
North Dakota  0 -0.026 1 1 2 4 0 
Ohio 5 1.153 3 3 4 6 2 
Oklahoma 2 0.434 1 1 3 7 8 
Oregon  0 0.662 2.5 2.5 3 5 1 
Pennsylvania 3 -0.661 1 1 4 8 2 
Rhode Island  0 0.090 1 1 4 7 1 
Page 15 of 336 
This document is available on the Great Lakes Center website at: http://www.greatlakescenter.org 
 
 
South Carolina  5 0.900 3 3 3 7 3 
South Dakota 0 -0.802 1 1 2 4 0 
Tennessee 4 0.320 1.5 1.5 3 9 3 
Texas  6 -0.660 5 5 5 9 5 
Utah 0 1.150 1 1 1 4 1 
Vermont  0 -0.268 1 1 3 7 5 
Virginia 2 0.550 2 2 1 9 1 
Washington  0 0.206 1 1 4 6 0 
West Virginia 3 0.900 3.5 3.5 3.5 8 3.5 
Wisconsin 0 -0.395 2 2 4 6 0 
Wyoming 0 -0.950 1 1 1 4 1 
* where H/H = 5; H/M or M/H =4; H/L or L/H=3; M/L or L/M=2; and L/L=1 
** where H/H=9; H/M=8; H/L=7; M/H=6; M/M=5; M/L=4; L/H=3; L/M=2; L/L=1 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations of Existing Accountability Measurement Systems  
 Amrein 
& 
Berliner 
Policy 
Activism
Carnoy 
1 
Carnoy 
2 
Boston 
Rating 
1* 
Boston 
Rating 
2** 
ECS 
Amrein & Berliner 1.000       
Policy Activism 0.361 1.000      
Carnoy 1 0.663 0.370 1.000     
Carnoy 2 0.636 0.433 0.926 1.000    
Boston Rating 1* 0.646 0.118 0.616 0.564 1.000   
Boston Rating 2** 0.655 0.361 0.575 0.541 0.561 1.000  
ECS 0.513 0.338 0.358 0.407 0.329 0.422 1.000 
* where H/H = 5; H/M or M/H =4; H/L or L/H=3; M/L or L/M=2; and L/L=1 
** where H/H=9; H/M=8; H/L=7; M/H=6; M/M=5; M/L=4; L/H=3; L/M=2; L/L=1 
 
 
Amrein and Berliner, Carnoy and Loeb, and the Boston systems were all positively 
correlated in spite of being based on relatively different conceptualizations of 
accountability “strength.”  Nonetheless, the differences among these systems are great 
enough as to raise concern and focus attention on better ways of measuring high-stakes 
pressure.  The policy activism scale is also positively related with other systems, 
suggesting some overlap between strength of accountability and degree to which policies 
are created and acted upon.  
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The Present Definition of High-Stakes Testing 
As was the case with Carnoy and Loeb, the feature of high-stakes testing that we 
wish to capture in our measure is the construct of “pressure” as it relates to the amount of 
“press” or “threat” associated with performance on a particular test.  However, our 
measurement approach to capturing this “threat” or “pressure” is based on a more 
differentiated conceptualization of high-stakes testing policy, practice, and 
implementation than has heretofore been carried out.  Although laws and regulations 
provide a political description of accountability in each state, they cannot fully describe 
the level, nature, and extremely varied impact of the laws on individuals.  For example, it 
might be state law to hold students back if they fail end-of-year exams, but the actual 
“threat” of this consequence as it is experienced by students, teachers, and parents 
depends on a great many influences including historical precedence (have students 
already been held back thus making the probability of it happening more realistic?), and 
the weight assigned to test performance (does a single test determine retention or are 
other considerations taken into account?).  This type of differentiation is significant in 
terms of the actual pressure experienced by students and teachers. 
In our measure of high-stakes pressure, state-level variation in high-stakes testing 
is accounted for by including both the actual laws as well as a proxy for their relative 
impact and implementation.  The range of potential sanctions and rewards that could exist 
at the state level was identified first.  For example, “Is it legal/mandatory for states to 
take over chronically underperforming schools?” and/or “Can states fire a teacher who 
works in a chronically underperforming school?” and so forth, using lists created by 
others as a starting point.44  Once possible accountability laws were identified (see Table 
Page 17 of 336 
This document is available on the Great Lakes Center website at: http://www.greatlakescenter.org 
 
 
5 for an overview), further aspects of the impact of the law were explored with follow-up 
questions such as:  “Has the state ever taken over a school?”  “How close are schools to 
be taken over?”  “How much support does the state provide to schools to avoid this 
consequence?”  “Do teachers accept the legitimacy of this potential sanction?”  “If 
schools have been taken over, who assumed leadership?”  “How successful was the 
transition?”  To answer these questions, we (a) interviewed state department of education 
representatives, (b) consulted media sources, and (c) corresponded with ECS 
representatives who had access to a wide range of legal information. 
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Table 5:  Overview of Possible Stakes  
 Possible Sanctions Possible Rewards 
Consequences to:   
   
Districts Publicly Labeled “Failing” Public Recognition 
 State Intervention Financial Rewards 
 State Takeover/Reorganization  
   
School Board Removal From Office Public Recognition 
 Salary Reduced/Eliminated  
   
Administrators:  Principals 
and Superintendents 
Publicly Associated With 
“Failing” School/District 
Publicly Praised for Success 
 Salary Reduction Financial Bonuses 
 Termination From Job  
   
Schools Publicly Labeled as a Failing 
School, or One That “Needs 
Improvement” 
Publicly Praised for Success 
 Financial Burden: Financial Rewards/Bonuses 
 • paying to send students to 
go to another school 
 
 • state makes firing decisions  
 • pay to set up tutoring  
 State Intervenes:  
 • sends “improvement team” 
to evaluate school 
 
 • state makes firing decisions  
 • state turns school over to 
independent agency 
 
 • state takes over school  
 • state closes school  
   
Teachers Publicly Labeled: Publicly Praised for Success 
 • bad teacher Receive Financial Bonuses 
 • associated with “failing” 
school 
 
 Stricter Monitoring of 
Teaching 
 
 Job Loss  
   
Students K-8:  Grade Retention K-8:  Parties Celebrating Test 
 High School:  Diploma 
Withheld 
High School:  College 
Scholarships 
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Measurement Part I: Creating a Pressure Rating Index 
The process of creating an index that would rank all 25 states45 in this study based 
on a continuum of “pressure” associated with the practice of high-stakes testing is 
described in two main sections below.  Part I includes a description of (a) the 
construction of  portfolios used to tell the story of state-level accountability, (b) the 
procedures used to convert the portfolios into a pressure rating index (PRI), and (c) the 
validity analysis associated with this index.  In part II, the procedures used to apply this 
index of state accountability pressure across time (1985-2004) are described.  
Portfolios 
The determination of a “pressure rating index” relied on a set of portfolios 
constructed to describe in as much detail as possible the past and current assessment and 
accountability practices of each state.  These portfolios were crafted to tell the “story” of 
accountability; therefore, they include a wide range of documentation describing the 
politics and impact of a state’s high-stakes testing program.  All portfolios included three 
main sections: (a) an introduction essay, (b) a rewards/sanction sheet, (c) and newspaper 
stories.  These are described in more detail next.  
Context for Assessing State-Level Stakes 
The first document in each portfolio was a summary essay of the state’s past and 
current assessment and accountability plan (see Appendix A for an example).  These 
essays included (a) some background information (e.g., name of past and current 
assessment system, implementation strategies), (b) a description of the most current 
assessment system, and (c) a summary of the rewards and sanctions (e.g., the current and 
past laws).  The summary was written to be accessible to readers with a reasonable 
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acquaintance with schools and education more broadly and provided a “soft” introduction 
to the nature of assessment and accountability in each state.  Importantly, these 
descriptions were informal and were not intended to represent fully the current or 
historical assessment and accountability activities in the state.  Rather the goal of this 
initial portfolio document was to contextualize that state’s accountability plan.  
Rewards/Sanction Worksheet 
Each portfolio contained a table that presented a range of questions and answers 
about what the state can do legally by way of consequences to districts, schools, and 
students (see Table 6 for an overview of all questions).  This table drew heavily on data 
compiled by the Education Commission of States as of 2002 that described many of the 
accountability laws on state books as of 2001.46  
In an effort to accurately represent a state’s high-stakes testing environment, the 
rewards/sanctions worksheet was included to provide more detailed information about 
not only what is legally possible, but in what ways the law is viewed or implemented.  
For example, it might be the case that a teacher can be fired legally, but in reality a state 
may never have done this.  This contrasts with another state where firing a teacher might 
not only be legal, but the state has already enacted the law and fired some teachers (An 
example of a completed rewards/sanctions worksheet is provided in Appendix B). 
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Table 6:  Summary of Sanctions/Rewards Worksheet Questions  
SANCTIONS 
Districts 
Does the state have authority to put school districts on probation? 
Can the state remove a district’s accreditation? 
Can the state withhold funding from the district? 
Can the state reorganize the district? 
Can the state take over the district? 
Does the state have the authority to replace superintendents? 
Schools 
Can schools be placed on probation? 
Can the state remove a school’s accreditation? 
Can the state withhold funding from the school? 
Can the state reconstitute a school? 
Can the state close a school? 
Can the state take over a school? 
Does the state have the authority to replace teachers? 
Does the state have the authority to replace principals? 
Students 
K-8: Is grade to grade promotion contingent on exam? 
K-8: If yes, for students in what grades? And what is the timing of implementation? 
HIGH SCHOOL: Do students have to pass an exam in order to receive a diploma? 
HIGH SCHOOL: Are there alternative routes to receiving a diploma? 
HIGH SCHOOL: Are students required to attend remediation programs if they fail?  (Who 
pays for it)? 
Students for whom English is a Second Language (LEP) 
Students with Disabilities 
REWARDS 
Districts 
Are districts rewarded for student performance? 
What types of awards are given (public recognition, certificates, monetary)? 
On what are rewards based (absolute performance or improvement)? 
Schools 
Are schools rewarded for student performance? 
What types of awards are given (public recognition, certificates, monetary)? 
On what are rewards based (absolute performance or improvement)? 
Students 
Are monetary awards or scholarships for college tuition given to high performing students? 
Public recognition of high performing students? 
NOTE: Italicized statements are questions/considerations that were added for this project and were not part 
of the original ECS report. 
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Media  
A range of newspaper stories were selected for inclusion in each portfolio.  These 
newspaper articles added to the state’s accountability “story” by providing a fuller picture 
of high stakes-testing impact.  For example, a chronology of media coverage can add 
texture and context to what is known about state laws by describing (a) the timing of 
accountability implementation (e.g., when students were being tested, how well they did, 
who was doing well, who was doing poorly), (b) the general reaction to the accountability 
implementation (e.g., Were there many debates?  Large agreement?  Was it phased in 
slowly?  Quickly?), and (c) editorials (e.g., op-ed pieces and letters to the editor) 
documenting readers’ and/or experts’ reactions to the accountability program.  A full 
description of the strategy for selecting newspaper stories is described in Appendix F.   
Media documentation was included because it provides a description of local 
cultural norms.  Its value has been noted by others.  “Documents are studied to 
understand culture—or the process and the array of objects, symbols, and meanings that 
make up social reality shared by members of a society.”47  Newspapers hold special 
relevance for representing cultural perspectives.  Although they are not error or bias free, 
they contribute substantially to our shared cultural knowledge of local, national, and 
international events.  In addition to their evidentiary role, newspapers reflect societal 
beliefs, reactions, values, and perspectives of current and historical events.  Thus, 
newspapers are a valuable forum for representing how a culture views and reacts to social 
events.  In this study, newspaper stories are one way to reflect not only each state’s story 
of how accountability evolved (e.g., What laws were proposed?  How were they debated?  
When were they passed?  How they were implemented?), but also to identify the cultural 
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norms influencing that state’s accountability system (e.g., Was there consensus on each 
proposal, or were there vehement disagreements?).  The inclusion of newspaper articles 
represents a unique strategy for measuring perceived high-stakes testing pressure.   
Scaling 
The method of “comparative judgments”48 was adopted for scaling the study 
states from low to high according to the relative level of “pressure” associated with its 
accountability and assessment system.  This scaling method was appropriate for assigning 
relational values among stimuli with complex, abstract psychological properties.  
Torgerson noted,49  
The law of comparative judgment is a set of equations relating the proportion of 
times any given stimulus k is judged greater on a given attribute than another 
other stimulus j to the scale values and discriminal dispersions of the two stimuli 
on the psychological continuum.  The set of equations is derived from the 
following postulates: 
1. Each stimulus when presented to an observer gives rise to a discriminal 
process which as some value on the psychological continuum of interest. 
2. Because of momentary fluctuations in the organism, a given stimulus does 
not always excite the same discriminal process, but may excite one with a 
higher or lower value on the continuum.  If any stimulus is presented to an 
observer a large number of times, a frequency distribution of discriminal 
processes associated with that stimulus will be generated.  It is postulated 
that the values of the discriminal processes are such that the frequency 
distribution is normal on the psychological continuum. 
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3. The mean and standard deviation of the distributions associated with a 
stimulus are taken as its scale value and discriminal dispersions 
respectively.  
The value of this approach is that judges do not have to assign an absolute rating to each 
stimulus.  Rather, it is only necessary that judges make a judgment about which of only 
two stimuli exhibits more of the construct of interest.  The “stimulus” in this study is the 
construct of “pressure” as reflected in the portfolio documentation.   
Matrix Results   
Independent judgments of the pressure associated with each of the 300 possible 
state pairings were collected.  To the judges’ data (averaging entries where there were 
more than one entry per cell), the least-squares solution for uni-dimensional scale values 
due to Mosteller50 was used to calculate rating scores.  The judges’ estimates of the 
directed distance between any two states on a hypothetical scale of “high stakes pressure” 
were taken as the raw distance data and formed a skew symmetric matrix of order 25 with 
entries on the interval -4 to +4 (the results of this conversion are displayed in Tables 7 
and 8). 
Validity Analysis 
As a check on validity of our index, two expert educators also reviewed all 25 
portfolios independently rating them on a scale of “pressure” from 1-5.  Table 7 displays 
the results of (a) the PRI results, (b) both experts’ rating decisions, (c) both rating 
systems identified by Carnoy and Loeb, (c) and averaged systems of the experts and of 
Carnoy and Loeb.  Table 8 displays the results of (a) the PRI results, (b) Amrein and 
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Berliner’s initial characterizations, (c) Swanson and Stevenson’s policy activism scale, 
(d) the Boston College classification system, and (e) ECS rating.    
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Table 7: Comparison of Accountability Measures Across 25 States 
  
PRI Expert 1 
Expert 
2 
Carnoy 
1 
Carnoy 
2 
Average 
Expert 
1 & 2 
Average 
Expert 1 & 
Carnoy & 
Loeb 1 
Average 
Expert 1 
& Carnoy 
& Loeb 2 
Average 
Expert 2 
& Carnoy 
& Loeb 1 
Average 
Expert 2 & 
Carnoy & 
Loeb 2 
Alabama 3.06 3 2 4 4 2.5 3.50 3.50 3.00 3.00 
Arizona 3.36 4.5 4 2 2 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.00 3.00 
Arkansas 2.60 2 3 1 1 2.5 1.50 1.50 2.00 2.00 
California 2.56 2.5 5 4 2 3.75 3.25 2.25 4.50 3.50 
Connecticut 1.60 1.5 1 1 1 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.00 1.00 
Georgia 3.44 5.5 4 2 2 4.75 3.75 3.75 3.00 3.00 
Hawaii 1.76 0.5 1 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00 
Kentucky 0.54 3 3 4 4 2.5 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Louisiana 3.72 5.5 5 3 3 5.25 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 
Maine 1.78 2 1 1 1 1.5 1.50 1.50 1.00 1.00 
Maryland 2.82 2 3 4 5 2.5 3.00 3.50 3.50 4.00 
Massachusetts 3.18 4 5 2 2 4.5 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.50 
Mississippi 3.82 5.5 2 3 3 3.75 4.25 4.25 2.50 2.50 
Missouri 2.14 1.5 3 1.5 1.5 2.25 1.50 1.50 2.25 2.25 
New Mexico 3.28 4.5 2 4 5 3.25 4.25 4.75 3.00 3.50 
New York 4.08 5.5 5 5 2 5.25 5.25 3.75 5.00 3.50 
North Carolina 4.14 3 4 5 5 3.5 4.00 4.00 4.50 4.50 
Rhode Island 1.90 1.5 1 1 1 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.00 1.00 
South Carolina 3.20 4.5 2 3 3 3.25 3.75 3.75 2.50 2.50 
Tennessee 3.50 3 4 1.5 1.5 3.5 2.25 2.25 2.75 2.75 
Texas 4.78 5 5 5 5 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Utah  2.80 2.5 2 1 1 2.25 1.75 1.75 1.50 1.50 
Virginia 3.08 5 4 2 2 4.5 3.50 3.50 3.00 3.00 
West Virginia 3.08 1.5 3 3.5 3.5 2.25 2.50 2.50 3.25 3.25 
Wyoming 1.00 2 1 1 1 1.5 1.50 1.50 1.00 1.00 
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Table 8: Comparison of Accountability Measures Across 25 States 
  
PRI Amrein & Berliner 
Policy 
Activism 
Boston 
Rating 1*
Boston 
Rating 2** ECS 
Alabama 3.06 4 2.195 4 9 4 
Arizona 3.36 0 -0.395 2 6 2 
Arkansas 2.60 0 -0.270 1 8 1 
California 2.56 5 0.090 4 9 2 
Connecticut 1.60 0 1.290 1 8 1 
Georgia 3.44 1 0.660 3 9 3 
Hawaii 1.76 0 0.320 1 4 1 
Kentucky 0.54 4 1.970 4 7 4 
Louisiana   3.72 5 -0.030 3 9 3 
Maine 1.78 0 1.290 1 7 1 
Maryland 2.82 5 2.460 4 9 5 
Massachusetts 3.18 3 0.320 4 9 2 
Mississippi 3.82 2 0.550 3 9 3 
Missouri 2.14 1 1.020 1 7 1 
New Mexico 3.28 5 0.780 4 9 4 
New York 4.08 4 0.090 5 9 2 
North Carolina 4.14 6 1.600 5 9 5 
Rhode Island 1.90 0 0.090 4 7 1 
South Carolina 3.20 5 0.900 3 7 3 
Tennessee 3.50 4 0.320 3 9 3 
Texas 4.78 6 -0.660 5 9 5 
Utah  2.80 0 1.150 1 4 1 
Virginia 3.08 2 0.550 1 9 1 
West Virginia 3.08 3 0.900 3.5 8 3.5 
Wyoming 1.00 0 -0.950 1 4 1 
* where H/H = 5; H/M or M/H =4; H/L or L/H=3; M/L or L/M=2; and L/L=1 
** where H/H=9; H/M=8; H/L=7; M/H=6; M/M=5; M/L=4; L/H=3; L/M=2; L/L=1 
 
Results of a correlation analysis are presented in Tables 9 and 10.  Our Pressure 
Rating Index (PRI) was positively correlated (above .60) with both experts’ judgments.  
Interestingly, the portfolio system, experts’ rating judgments, and Carnoy and Loeb’s 
index showed positive, but relatively weak correlations.  For example, at one extreme, 
Expert 2 and Carnoy and Loeb 2 correlated only .29.   
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Table 9: Correlations of PRI, Experts’ and Carnoy and Loeb’s Rating Systems 
 
PRI Expert 1 Expert 2 
Carnoy 
& Loeb 
1 
Carnoy 
& Loeb 
2 
Average 
Expert 1 
& 2 
PRI 1.00      
Expert 1 0.68 1.00     
Expert 2 0.63 0.57 1.00    
Carnoy 1 0.53 0.44 0.51 1.00   
Carnoy 2 0.45 0.34 0.29 0.85 1.00  
Average Expert 1 & 2 0.77 0.89 0.87 0.52 0.34 1.00 
 
In Table 10, among the correlations bearing on the validity of the PRI ratings is 
the correlation between the newly derived PRI rating and the average of the ratings given 
by Expert 1 and Carnoy and Loeb 1 (.72), and the correlation of the PRI with the average 
of Expert 1 and Carnoy and Loeb 2 (.70).  The high correlations between some of the 
other measures (e.g., Amrein & Berliner with either expert averaged with Carnoy & Loeb 
ratings) most likely resulted from the fact that both Amrein and Berliner and Carnoy and 
Loeb were essentially counting provisions in the same set of laws. 
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Table 10: Correlations of PRI, Averaged Ratings, Boston, ECS, and Amrein and Berliner 
  
PRI 
Average 
Expert 1 & 
Carnoy & 
Loeb 1 
Average 
Expert 1 & 
Carnoy & 
Loeb 2 
Average 
Expert 2 & 
Carnoy & 
Loeb 1 
Average 
Expert 2 & 
Carnoy & 
Loeb 2 
Amrein & 
Berliner 
Policy 
Activism 
Boston 
Rating 1* 
Boston 
Rating 2** ECS 
PRI 1.00          
Average 
Expert 1 & 
Carnoy & 
Loeb 1 
0.72 1.00         
Average 
Expert 1 & 
Carnoy & 
Loeb 2 
0.70 0.95 1.00        
Average 
Expert 2 & 
Carnoy & 
Loeb 1 
0.66 0.85 0.75 1.00       
Average 
Expert 2 & 
Carnoy & 
Loeb 2 
0.67 0.83 0.83 0.95 1.00      
Amrein & 
Berliner 0.54 0.75 0.74 0.82 0.85 1.00     
Policy 
Activism -0.18 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.22 1.00    
Boston 
Rating 1* 0.51 0.71 0.66 0.77 0.75 0.79 0.14 1.00   
Boston 
Rating 2** 0.59 0.63 0.62 0.67 0.68 0.64 0.18 0.61 1.00  
ECS 0.49 0.67 0.77 0.67 0.80 0.82 0.38 0.76 0.53 1.00 
* where H/H = 5; H/M or M/H =4; H/L or L/H=3; M/L or L/M=2; and L/L=1 
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** where H/H=9; H/M=8; H/L=7; M/H=6; M/M=5; M/L=4; L/H=3; L/M=2; L/L=1 
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Because none of the prior measures of high-stakes pressure took into account the actual 
experience of administrators, teachers, students, and parents subjected to the 
accountability programs, and because the present empirically-derived PRI index shows 
consistent positive correlations with indices derived from proxies (features of state laws 
and regulations) for the actual experience of being subjected to high-stakes testing 
pressure, the PRI is offered as the most valid measure to date of the construct of  
“accountability strength” or “high-stakes testing pressure.”   
Measurement Part II: High-Stakes Pressure Over Time 
The PRI represents a judgment of state pressure pooled across all current and past 
accountability activities made as of summer 2004; therefore, this one-time rating index 
does not identify when or by how much high-stakes testing pressure grew over the 
preceding years.  For our second set of analyses, we also identified the years during 
which each state’s “pressure” increased and assigned a numerical value to that change. 
For example, consider a state where a statewide standardized test was first administered 
to all students in grades 3-8 in 1990.  Three years later (1993), the state began holding 
students back in grades 3 and 8 if they did not pass this test, and in 1999 a law was 
passed mandating that teachers could be fired or financially compensated based on 
students’ test performance.  Given this scenario, it could be argued that prior to 1993 
there was “minimal” (if any) pressure on students and teachers to do well on a test.  But 
in 1993, this pressure increased somewhat—most specifically for third and eighth graders 
and their teachers, and by 1999, the pressure increased again, this time for all teachers. 
This change in pressure could be depicted the following way:   
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Year  1990 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 
Pressure  1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Of course, these hypothetical increases are not sensitive to the differential changes in 
pressure to individual schools, districts, administrators, teachers, and students.  Instead, 
they reflect, as the PRI does, a pooled increase in the amount of pressure as it exists 
across the entire state.    
Assigning values to the timing of accountability implementation was a two-step 
process.  First, one of our education experts read through all 25 portfolios and made a 
series of judgments about the timing of high-stakes testing increases in each state.  On a 
scale of 0 to 5, this expert assigned a value for the level of threat for each state and for 
each year from 1985-2004.  As a check, a second reader followed the same procedure for 
a random selection of five portfolios.  The results of both readers’ judgments on these 
five states are presented in Table 11. 
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Table 11:  Two Threat Progression Rating Judgments 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
AR  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 
AR  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
                     
TN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 
TN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
                     
MO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 
MO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
                     
NC 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 
NC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
                     
NM 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
NM 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
NOTE: Judgments by Reader 1 are the non-bolded line, and by Reader 2 are the bolded line.  
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For four out of the five states, both experts agreed on the year during which stakes first 
were attached (e.g., AR, TN, MO, and NM).  Also, the experts agreed on two out of the 
three identified pressure “jump years” for Arkansas (1995, 1999), one out of three for 
Tennessee (1992), one out of two for Missouri (1993), one out of three for North 
Carolina (1996), and two out of four for New Mexico (1986 and 2000).  
Although experts’ judgments did not reach an especially high degree of 
agreement on the intervening years during which pressure escalated, experts’ level of 
agreement on the year during which stakes were first attached to testing was relatively 
high.  Further, experts’ level of agreement across the entire time span and the relative 
amount of “jump” in pressure gain overall was relatively consistent (e.g., rating pressure 
was judged to have doubled for Arkansas and Missouri and viewed to end at the same 
degree of pressure for Tennessee and North Carolina.  But, perhaps more importantly, a 
second look at Table 9 shows that that Expert 1 had the highest correlation with PRI (r  = 
.68).  Expert 2 was only slightly lower in agreement with the PRI (r = .63) and the 
Carnoy and Loeb indices were well below both experts (r = .53 and .45).  Given the 
impracticality of asking hundreds of judges to rate high-stakes pressure for every year 
from 1985 to 2003 and for every state, it was decided to let Expert 1 provide all 
judgments of pressure increase between the years 1985 and 2004 (Table 12).  Expert 1 
serves as the best available surrogate for the many judges who gave us a robust (albeit 
cross-sectional) measure of high-sakes testing (i.e., PRI).   
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Table 12:  Finalized Threat Progression Ratings 
  ’85 ’86 ’87 ’88 ’89 ’90 ’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 
Hawaii 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Connecticut 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Kentucky*  1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Maryland 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Maine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Arkansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Utah 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 
California 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Alabama 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
North Carolina* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
New Mexico 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
Texas* 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 5 5 
Mississippi* 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 
Louisiana* 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 
New York 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 5 6 6 6 6 
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 
*These states were evaluated twice. The values here represent the revised judgments.
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Methodology 
 The procedures used to obtain all paired comparison judgments are described in 
this section.  This section starts with a description of the participants who provided their 
paired comparison judgments followed by the method of analysis used to examine the 
relationship of pressure and student achievement.  
Procedures 
The process of comparative judgments requires each individual stimulus (or each 
state) to be paired with every other.  Thus, it was necessary to enlist the participation of 
300 individuals who would each review the contents of two state portfolios and provide 
us with their judgment as to which of the two states exhibited more of the hypothetical 
construct of “pressure.”  Graduate-level education students were enlisted for participation 
because they are familiar with educational terms and activities such as testing and 
instruction.  First, instructors at three major universities in the Southwest were contacted 
to see if they would be willing to allot two hours of teaching time to this project.  Once 
the help of 13 instructors at the three universities was obtained, a schedule was arranged 
for times to conduct the study during summer school sessions (May – June, 2004).  All 13 
instructors provided us with class time.  Some offered us the opportunity to come to their 
class on two occasions.  In total, one undergraduate level and 15 graduate-level classes 
were visited.    
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All data were collected with groups of students attending summer school courses. 
Each class was given verbal and written instructions for the task.  The following 
introduction was provided first: 
Thanks for taking the time to participate in this important project.  I am working 
with professors at [university name] on a project to look at the relationship of 
high-stakes testing across the states with student achievement.  I am here asking 
for your help to determine the relative level of “pressure” associated with the 
practice of high-stakes testing in each state.  More specifically, you will be given 
two state portfolios and asked to make a single decision:  based on the content of 
both portfolios, which state do you feel exerts a greater level of pressure on the 
educational players in the state (including students, teachers, and administrators)?  
You will be making a “pooled” judgment across a wide range of information.  For 
example, you may have one state that exerts pressure on teachers but not students 
and another state that exerts pressure on students but not teachers.  We are asking 
that you take in all the information and make a generalized assessment about the 
state, accounting for the pressure to all the players.  Simply stated, make your best 
judgment about which state as a whole exerts more pressure.  
Each participant then received a pair of portfolios, a directions sheet (see 
Appendix C) and an accompanying recording data sheet (see Appendix D).  They were 
then given the following directions: 
You are provided with a data sheet that contains three parts.  The first part is a 
worksheet.  Some people like to take notes when they are reading, others do not. 
It does not matter to me if you fill this out; I have simply provided it for those of 
Page 38 of 336 
This document is available on the Great Lakes Center website at: http://www.greatlakescenter.org 
 
 
you who like to take notes as they read.  The second sheet is the one I am most 
interested in and is the sheet where you tell me which of your two states has a 
higher level of pressure than your second state.  As you can see, there are two 
scales.  Please assign a single number to each of your states—on a scale of 1 – 7 
how much pressure is exerted (where 1 is low pressure and 7 is high pressure).  
The only rule is that you cannot assign the same number to both states—you must 
make a decision about which is “higher.”  You may think one state is higher by 
one point, or you may determine it is higher by more.  Just use your best judgment 
to make a distinction.   
Participants were then given a few last thoughts to help them feel comfortable with the 
task: 
Everyone reads at a different rate, some may be able to go through the portfolios 
and make a decision in about an hour; others may take 2 or more hours.  Please 
take as much time as you need to make the best judgment possible.  Note that 
there is highlighting throughout the portfolio.  This was done not to dissuade you 
from reading, but to facilitate your reading.  Please read as much as you need 
again, to make the best judgment you can.  
Also, there are no right or wrong answers.  I have no extant expectations 
on how each of these states compare, you are helping me figure that part out.  
Lastly, although no one has the same TWO states, many of you may have one 
state that is the same.  For example, student A may have Arizona and Maine, and 
student B may have Arizona and Texas.  It is perfectly acceptable to talk about the 
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contents of your portfolios.  I only ask that you do not discuss your pending 
judgments as everyone is making a judgment based on the two states they have.   
It was also pointed out that throughout the portfolio significant portions were highlighted. 
This was done to facilitate the process of reviewing so much information in one sitting. 
Anecdotal information suggested that highlighting sections of the portfolio greatly 
facilitated the process without significantly altering judgments about the portfolio as a 
whole.51 
Participants 
A total of 346 paired comparison judgments were collected.  The number of 
individuals who provided the judgments was fewer than 346 since several individuals 
participated more than once (in one case, three times).  It is difficult to accurately assess 
the number of participants since all data was collected anonymously.  However, 
judgments from approximately 250 different persons were obtained.  Of the total 346 
paired comparisons, 239 (69 percent) were provided by females and 93 (27 percent) by 
males, with gender missing on 14 (4 percent).  Many participants had taught for some 
period of time in a K-12 or university setting.  There were 254 (73 percent) participants 
who replied “yes” and 77 (22 percent) who replied “no” to the question, “Have you ever 
taught?”  (Fourteen provided no data.)  Most participants were in a graduate school 
program with 313 specifying they were in one of the following degree programs: MA 
(142), EdD (22), PhD (32), or graduate level school, degree unspecified (117).  There 
were only 14 who were in an undergraduate program and one participant in a post-
baccalaureate program.  
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Feedback on Method 
Time for data collection varied from one to three hours per person comparing two 
states.  After every data collection session, some participants were asked to provide 
feedback on their confidence level for their judgments.  An overwhelming majority of 
those asked felt confident that they made the right judgment.  Further, participants often 
reported that (a) the task was very interesting and (b) that at least one of their states stood 
out as having more pressure than the other.  Comments also included that the “task was 
interesting,” that “they couldn’t believe the dramatic differences between states,” or that 
“they had no idea how bad some states had it.”  For those who were teaching at the time 
of the task, many felt relieved they did not live in another state they perceived to be 
dramatically greater in the pressure exerted on teachers and students than what they were 
experiencing.  Many noted, “Thank goodness I don’t work in state X,” or, “I will never 
move to state X.”   
 Participants were also asked their strategy for using the materials provided to 
them.  It was clear that strategies varied widely.  Some participants relied heavily on the 
rewards/sanctions worksheet whereas others thought the newspaper documents helped 
them more.  Some used the comparison sheets as a starting point and went back and forth 
between portfolios on each specific document, whereas others would go through one 
portfolio before looking at the second one.  
Method of Analysis 
 Four approaches were used in our analyses.  First, we used our accountability 
rating system to replicate Carnoy and Loeb’s analysis and to test their conclusion that 
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high-stakes testing is related to achievement gains for minority students.  This included 
the replication of three regression models.   
Carnoy and Loeb’s first regression model estimates accountability 
implementation as a function of the average level of National Assessment of Education 
Progress (NAEP) test scores in each state in the early 1990s, test score gains in the early 
1990s, the percent of Latinos and African Americans in the state, the state population, the 
percent of school revenues raised at the state level in 1995,52 average per-pupil revenues 
in 1990, and the yearly change in revenues in the early 1990s: 
(1)     Ai = β0 + β1Ti + β2Ri +  β3Pi + β4Si + β5Di є 
Where, 
A = strength of accountability in state (measured by our rating system); 
T = average scale score of fourth grade students in state on the 1992 math 
NAEP; 
R = the proportion of African American and Hispanic (public school) 
students in state i; 
P = the state population; and 
S = the proportion of schools’ funds coming from the state rather than 
local sources in 1995; and 
D = Dollars per pupil revenues in 1990 and the yearly percent change in 
revenue from 1990 to 1995. 
Carnoy and Loeb’s second regression tests whether the proportion of eighth 
graders (or fourth graders) achieving at the basic skills level or better (and at the 
Page 42 of 336 
This document is available on the Great Lakes Center website at: http://www.greatlakescenter.org 
 
 
proficient level or better on the NAEP math test) increased more between 1996 and 2000 
in states with “stronger” accountability.53  Again, we adopted their regression equation: 
(2)   Gi = ф0 + ф 1Ai + ф 2Mi + ф 3Ti (or Hi) + ф 4Si + є 
Where, 
G = the change in the proportion of eighth grade students in state i who 
demonstrate basic skills or better on the mathematics NAEP between 1996 
and 2000; 
A = strength of accountability in state (measured by our PRI system); 
M = the proportion of African American and Hispanic (public school) 
students in state i; 
T = the average percentage of eighth grade students in state i 
demonstrating basic math skills or better or demonstrating proficient level 
or better on the mathematics NAEP in 1996; 
H = the change in the average percentage of eighth grade students in state i 
demonstrating basic math skills or better on the mathematics NAEP 
between 1992 and 1996; 
S = a dichotomous variable indicating whether state is in the South. 
In terms of their third regression model, we looked at whether ninth-grade 
retention rates increased more in the late ’90s in states with “strong” accountability than 
in states with “weak accountability.”  
(3)   Rti or Pgi = Ө0 + Ө 1Ai + Ө 2Ti + Ө 3Mi + Ө 4Pi + Ө5Si + є 
Where, 
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Rt = the ninth grade retention rate in state i; 
Pg = the high school progression rate in state i; and 
T = NAEP eighth grade math test scores in 1996. 
The second part of our results includes a series of correlations investigating the 
relationship between overall changes in high-stakes testing “pressure” and overall 
achievement gains.  First, we analyze whether pressure is associated with achievement 
gains between the very first year of NAEP administration and the most recent.  Then the 
relationship between change in pressure rating and NAEP gains by student cohort is 
analyzed.  Lastly, a series of correlations investigating whether prior changes in high-
stakes testing pressure is related to subsequent changes in NAEP achievement (both in 
terms of a cross-sectional and cohort strategy) is calculated. 
Data 
Data from NAEP tests were used as the achievement indicator for fourth- and 
eighth-grade math and reading.54  NAEP data included both scale score and proficiency 
percentages at the state level and disaggregated by ethnicity.  Demographic information 
for the Carnoy and Loeb replication analysis including percent of African American and 
Hispanic students in each state as of 1995, percent of school funds coming from state 
rather than local revenues,55 and state population demographic characteristics56 were 
drawn from a variety of internet sources.   
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Results 
Part I: Carnoy and Loeb Replication 
Carnoy and Loeb conducted a series of analyses to test the relationship of their 
strength of accountability index against a range of achievement and demographic 
variables.  Their analyses are replicated, substituting our PRI for their index.57   
Replicating Carnoy and Loeb’s Equation One  
 To test whether our accountability measure was related to various demographic 
variables identified by Carnoy and Loeb, correlation and regression analyses were 
computed (see Tables 13 and 14).  
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Table 13: Correlations of PRI, Demographic, and Achievement Variables:  NAEP Fourth-Grade Math and Reading 
  A B C D E F G H I J K L 
A: PRI 1.000            
B: State Population (1995), 
used 1990 Census Data 0.357 1.000           
C: Proportion African 
American and Hispanic in 
state in 1995 
0.675 0.519 1.000          
D: 1992 math fourth-grade 
White scale score -0.114 0.035 -0.097 1.000         
E: 1992 math fourth grade 
African American scale score  0.364 0.237 0.526 -0.109 1.000        
F: 1992 fourth-grade reading 
White, % at least basic -0.109 -0.004 -0.164 0.657 -0.306 1.000       
G: 1992 fourth-grade reading 
African American, % at least 
basic 
0.106 -0.093 -0.135 -0.341 -0.136 -0.255 1.000      
H: Change in fourth-grade 
reading 1992-1994 White 0.045 -0.292 -0.144 -0.115 0.105 -0.001 0.141 1.000     
I: Change in fourth-grade 
reading 1992-1994 African 
American 
-0.403 -0.208 -0.473 -0.125 -0.353 -0.032 0.344 0.225 1.000    
J: Yearly percent revenue 
change 1990-1995 (Average of 
all yearly changes) 
0.019 -0.274 -0.210 -0.327 -0.053 -0.396 0.482 0.111 0.429 1.000   
K: Proportion of revenues 
coming from state (not local or 
federal) 
-0.146 -0.242 -0.161 -0.501 0.046 -0.641 0.495 0.117 0.252 0.312 1.000  
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L: Average Per pupil Revenue 
1990-1991 -0.191 0.143 -0.126 0.308 0.077 0.584 -0.221 0.248 -0.056 -0.554 -0.411 1.000 
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These correlations suggest that corresponding to what Carnoy and Loeb found, 
state composition (those with a higher proportion of African American and Hispanic 
students) is related to accountability pressure.  However, in contrast to their finding that 
states with lower NAEP scores in the early 1990s implemented stronger accountability 
systems later (for White students), there is no evidence that pressure is associated with 
early NAEP performance among Whites.  Instead, pressure is positively related to math 
fourth-grade African American scale score (1992) but negatively correlated to the change 
in fourth-grade reading scale scores (1992-1994) for African American students.  
Our regression model was not significant (See Table 14).  When all demographic 
and achievement variables were entered simultaneously, the only significant predictor of 
accountability pressure was the state composition variable—states with a greater 
proportion of minority students (African American and Hispanic) implemented 
accountability systems that fostered greater pressure.  
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Table 14:  Regression Model: Predicting Accountability 
From Achievement and Demographic Variables 
ANOVA 
     
  
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 11.000 15.285 1.390 1.980 0.121 
Residual 13.000 9.122 0.702   
Total 24.000 24.407    
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Table 14, continued   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Intercept 2.478 5.935 0.417 0.683 -10.344 15.300 -10.344 15.300 
1995 Census 
Estimates 0.000 0.000 0.702 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Proportion African 
American and 
Hispanic 1995 
2.866 1.785 1.606 0.132 -0.989 6.721 -0.989 6.721 
1992 fourth-grade 
math White scale 
score 
-0.009 0.026 -0.366 0.720 -0.065 0.047 -0.065 0.047 
1992 fourth-grade 
math African 
American scale 
score 
0.001 0.004 0.356 0.727 -0.007 0.010 -0.007 0.010 
1992 fourth-grade 
reading White, % 
at least basic 
3.321 6.098 0.545 0.595 -9.854 16.496 -9.854 16.496 
1992 fourth-grade 
reading African 
American, % at 
least basic 
2.430 2.046 1.188 0.256 -1.990 6.850 -1.990 6.850 
Change in fourth-
grade reading 
1992-1994 White 
0.091 0.071 1.271 0.226 -0.063 0.245 -0.063 0.245 
Change in fourth-
grade reading 
1992-1994 African 
American 
-0.048 0.041 -1.189 0.256 -0.136 0.040 -0.136 0.040 
Yearly percent 
revenue change 
1990-1995 (Average 
of all yearly 
changes) 
3.990 25.160 0.159 0.876 -50.365 58.345 -50.365 58.345 
Proportion of 
revenues coming 
from state (not 
local or federal) 
-1.599 2.153 -0.742 0.471 -6.250 3.053 -6.250 3.053 
Average per pupil 
Revenue 1990-1991 0.000 0.000 -1.036 0.319 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
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Table 14, continued 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.791 
R Square 0.626 
Adjusted R 
Square 0.310 
Standard Error 0.838 
Observations 25.000 
 
Replication of Carnoy and Loeb’s Equation Two  
 Carnoy and Loeb’s second regression model is replicated to test whether 
accountability was related to achievement.  In this set of analyses, Carnoy and Loeb 
included a measure of whether a state was located in the south—a variable identified by 
others.58  Importantly, Carnoy and Loeb’s definition of what state was in the south was 
unclear; therefore, our findings are presented based on all possible characterizations.  
Correlations and regression results for eighth-grade achievement are presented in Tables 
15 and 16, and correlations and regression results for fourth-grade achievement are 
presented in Tables 19 and 20. 
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Table 15: Correlations of PRI With Proportion of Students Achieving at Basic or 
Better: Eighth-Grade Math (1996-2000) 
 A B C D E F G H I 
A: PRI 1.000         
B: Change in % at 
or above basic 
eighth-grade math 
1996-2000 
0.446 1.000        
C: Proportion 
African American 
and Hispanic 1995 
0.676 0.394 1.000       
D: Eighth-grade 
math at or above 
basic 1996 
-0.404 -0.446 -0.591 1.000      
E: Eighth-grade 
math at or above 
proficient 1996 
-0.301 -0.306 -0.408 0.937 1.000     
F: Change in % at 
or above basic 
eighth-grade math 
1992-1996 
0.092 0.045 -0.253 0.124 0.111 1.000    
G: State in South? 
(0=no; 1=yes)* 0.466 0.475 0.426 -0.644 -0.686 0.158 1.000   
H: State in South? 
(0=no; 1=yes)** 0.387 0.613 0.274 -0.599 -0.614 0.258 0.852 1.000  
I: State in South? 
(0=no; 1=yes)*** 0.232 0.511 0.153 -0.624 -0.649 0.189 0.786 0.923 1.000 
* with southwestern states (AZ, NM, and TX as yes) 
** with AZ and NM as no, and TX as yes 
*** with AZ, NM, and TX as no 
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These correlations reveal a positive relationship between pressure, as measured by the 
PRI, and the change in the percent of students at or above basic in eighth-grade math later 
in the 1990s (1996-2000).  However, we wondered if this positive correlation was 
confounded by increases in exclusion rates; therefore we calculated a partial correlation 
holding 2000 NAEP exclusion rates constant.  For this (and all subsequent partial 
correlation equations) we adopt the equation: 
    r 12 - (r 13) (r 23) 
r 12.3 = √ (1 – r 13² ) (1 – r 23²) 
 
where: 
r 12 = Correlation of NAEP indicator and PRI indicator; 
r 1 3 = Correlation of NAEP indicator and exclusion rate; 
r 2 3 = Correlation of PRI indicator and exclusion rate. 
When exclusion rates are partialed out of the relationship, the correlation drops to 
essentially zero (r = .026).  
A regression analysis that assesses whether pressure (PRI) or any demographic 
variables predict changes in the percent of students at or above basic in eighth-grade math 
between 1996-2000 is significant and is largely explained by a negative effect of yearly 
percent change in state-revenue (1990-1995) and not high-stakes testing pressure. 
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Table 16: Regression Model: Predicting Eighth-Grade Math NAEP 
Change (1996-2000) From PRI and Demographic Variables. 
ANOVA 
     
  
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 12.000 362.223 30.185 3.378 0.022 
Residual 12.000 107.217 8.935   
Total 24.000 469.440    
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Table 16, continued 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 22.254 14.053 1.584 0.139 -8.364 52.873 -8.364 52.873 
PRI 1.277 0.938 1.362 0.198 -0.766 3.321 -0.766 3.321 
1996 eighth-grade 
math at or above 
basic 
-0.343 0.165 -2.079 0.060 -0.703 0.016 -0.703 0.016 
Proportion African 
American and 
Hispanic  1995 
-16.769 10.861 -1.544 0.149 -40.433 6.894 -40.433 6.894 
1995 Census 
Estimates 0.000 0.000 -0.496 0.629 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Proportion of 
revenues coming 
from state (not 
local or federal) 
-6.402 6.833 -0.937 0.367 -21.291 8.486 -21.291 8.486 
Average Per pupil 
Revenue 1990-1991 0.000 0.001 0.617 0.549 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
Yearly percent 
revenue change 
1990-1995 
(Average of all 
yearly changes) 
-203.730 80.830 -2.520 0.027 -379.844 -27.617 -379.844 -27.617 
Change in 
Population 1996-
2000 
17.690 38.672 0.457 0.656 -66.569 101.949 -66.569 101.949 
Change proportion 
of African 
American/Hispanic 
Students 1996-
2000 
30.129 12.331 2.443 0.031 3.262 56.996 3.262 56.996 
State in South?*  -2.837 3.435 -0.826 0.425 -10.321 4.647 -10.321 4.647 
State in South?** 13.249 4.664 2.841 0.015 3.088 23.410 3.088 23.410 
State in South?*** -6.214 4.204 -1.478 0.165 -15.374 2.947 -15.374 2.947 
* with southwestern states (AZ, NM, and TX as yes) 
** with AZ and NM as no, and TX as yes 
*** with AZ, NM, and TX as no 
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Table 16, continued 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.878 
R Square 0.772 
Adjusted R 
Square 0.543 
Standard Error 2.989 
Observations 25.000 
 
Similar to analyses by Carnoy and Loeb, another set of analyses was done by 
disaggregating the data by student ethnicity.  Correlation results (Table 17) suggest that 
pressure is associated with changes in the percentages of students who achieve at basic or 
above (again, eighth-grade math, 1996-2000) for African American students but not for 
White or Hispanic students (correlations between achievement indicators and PRI are in 
bold).   
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Table 17: Correlation of Eighth-Grade Math NAEP Performance with Demographic Variables  
and PRI and Disaggregated by Student Ethnicity 
 
A B C D E F G H I 
A: PRI 1.000         
B: Proportion African 
American and Hispanic 1995 0.675 1.000        
C: 1995 Census Estimates 0.357 0.519 1.000       
D: Average per pupil 
revenue 1990-1991 -0.191 -0.126 0.143 1.000      
E: Change in population 
1996-2000 0.429 0.429 0.281 -0.390 1.000     
F: Change proportion of 
African American/Hispanic 
students 1996-2000 
-0.046 0.168 0.094 0.133 0.113 1.000    
G: Change % at or above 
basic 1996-2000 Hispanic 0.094 0.055 0.270 0.325 -0.495 -0.086 1.000   
H: Change % at or above 
vasic 1996-2000 African 
American 
0.456 0.170 0.036 0.272 -0.032 0.021 0.384 1.000  
I: Change % at or above 
basic 1996-2000 White 0.054 -0.078 0.016 0.242 0.201 0.135 -0.017 0.419 1.000 
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A scatter plot of the relationship between change in percent at or above basic (1996-
2000) for African American students and PRI suggests there are no conspicuous outliers 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1:  Scatter Plot of Change in Percent of Eighth-Grade Students At or Above 
Basic (1996-2000) NAEP Math and PRI: African American Students 
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Correlation analyses substituting NAEP scale scores for percent scoring at or 
above basic were calculated (see Table 18).  The relationship between average NAEP 
scale score gains from 1996-2000 and pressure is low but positive for students overall 
and when disaggregated by student ethnicity. 
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Table 18: Correlation of Eighth-Grade Math NAEP Average Scale Score Gains Disaggregated by  
Ethnicity, PRI, and State Demographic Variables 
  
A B C D E F G H I J 
A: PRI 1.000          
B: Proportion African 
American and Hispanic 
1995 
0.675 1.000         
C: 1995 Census Estimates 0.357 0.519 1.000        
D: Average Per Pupil 
Revenue 1990-1991 -0.191 -0.126 0.143 1.000       
E: Change in Population 
1996-2000 0.429 0.429 0.281 -0.390 1.000      
F: Change proportion of 
African American/ 
Hispanic Students 1996-
2000 
-0.046 0.168 0.094 0.133 0.113 1.000     
G: NAEP Gain 1996-2000 
All  0.372* 0.227 0.044 0.234 -0.009 0.211 1.000    
H: NAEP Gain 1996-2000 
White 0.213 0.112 -0.068 0.284 0.015 0.272 0.872 1.000   
I: NAEP Gain 1996-2000 
African American 0.274 0.119 0.056 0.396 -0.259 0.019 0.715 0.512 1.000  
J: NAEP Gain 1996-2000 
Hispanic 0.314 0.228 0.370 0.566 -0.116 0.057 0.358 0.277 0.322 1.000 
* Partial correlation holding 2000 exclusion rates constant is .320. 
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Scatter plots of all NAEP scale and gain scores with PRI are presented in Figures 
2, 3, and 4.  For white students, a correlation between NAEP gain and PRI eliminating 
North Carolina as a potential outlier (with NAEP gain of 9) lowers the overall 
relationship to r =.085.  There are no conspicuous outliers for African American or 
Hispanic students.   
 
Figure 2:  Scatter Plot of Eighth-Grade White Students NAEP Scale Score Gain and 
PRI 
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Figure 3: Scatter Plot of Eighth-Grade African American Students NAEP Scale 
Score Gain and PRI 
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Figure 4: Scatter Plot of Eighth-Grade Hispanic Students NAEP Scale Score Gain 
and PRI 
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The same correlations and regression models are calculated for fourth-grade math 
data.  First, a series of correlations looking at the relationship between pressure and 
change in percent of students achieving at basic and/or proficiency or above during 1996-
2000 was calculated.  A positive relationship between overall pressure and a change in 
the percentage of students achieving at basic or above from 1996-2000 (Table 19) was 
found. 
 
Table 19: Correlations of Fourth-Grade NAEP Achievement, PRI, and 
Demographic Variables 
  
A B C D E F G H 
A: PRI 1.000        
B: Change in percent at 
or above basic 1996-
2000 All 
0.350 1.000       
C: Proportion African 
American and Hispanic  
1995 
0.675 0.378 1.000      
D: Percent at or above 
basic, fourth-grade 
math 1996 All 
-0.227 -0.270 -0.552 1.000     
E: Percent at or above 
proficient, fourth-grade 
math 1996 All 
-0.180 -0.268 -0.439 0.960 1.000    
F: State in South?*  0.466 0.245 0.426 -0.471 -0.512 1.000   
G: State in South?** 0.387 0.420 0.274 -0.380 -0.408 0.852 1.000  
H: State in South?*** 0.232 0.356 0.153 -0.470 -0.515 0.786 0.923 1.000 
* with southwestern states (AZ, NM, and TX as yes) 
** with AZ and NM as no, and TX as yes 
*** with AZ, NM, and TX as no 
NOTE: Partial correlation of PRI and change in percent at or above basic, 1996-2000 holding 2000 NAEP exclusion 
rates constant is .346 
 
We regressed our pressure index along with demographic and achievement variables 
against the change in percent of students achieving at basic or above from 1996-2000 for 
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fourth-grade math.  Our regression was significant and was largely explained by year 
percent revenue change (1990-1995) and not pressure associated with high-stakes testing 
(see Table 20).  
Table 20: Regression Model: Predicting Changes in NAEP Proficiency— 
Fourth-Grade Math 
ANOVA 
     
  
df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 13.000 0.030 0.002 3.500 0.022 
Residual 11.000 0.007 0.001   
Total 24.000 0.038    
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Table 20, continued 
  Coefficients StandardError t Stat P-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Intercept 0.027 0.163 0.168 0.870 -0.330 0.385 -0.330 0.385 
PRI 0.014 0.009 1.587 0.141 -0.005 0.032 -0.005 0.032 
At or above basic 1996 All 0.434 0.345 1.259 0.234 -0.325 1.194 -0.325 1.194 
Proportion African 
American and Hispanic 1995 0.072 0.114 0.631 0.541 -0.179 0.322 -0.179 0.322 
1995 Census Estimates 0.000 0.000 -1.866 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Proportion of 1995 revenues 
coming from state (not local 
or federal) 
-0.039 0.063 -0.612 0.553 -0.178 0.101 -0.178 0.101 
Average er pupil revenue 
1990-1991 0.000 0.000 -1.744 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
At or above proficient 1996 
fourth-grade math -0.899 0.473 -1.899 0.084 -1.940 0.143 -1.940 0.143 
Yearly percent revenue 
change 1990-1995 (average of 
all yearly changes) 
-2.857 0.698 -4.094 0.002 -4.393 -1.321 -4.393 -1.321 
Change in population 1996-
2000 -0.453 0.328 -1.383 0.194 -1.175 0.268 -1.175 0.268 
Change proportion of 
African American / Hispanic 
students 1996-2000 
0.204 0.111 1.844 0.092 -0.040 0.448 -0.040 0.448 
State in South?*  -0.102 0.035 -2.894 0.015 -0.180 -0.025 -0.180 -0.025 
State in South?**  0.155 0.047 3.289 0.007 0.051 0.259 0.051 0.259 
State in South?***  -0.054 0.040 -1.345 0.206 -0.144 0.035 -0.144 0.035 
* with southwestern states (AZ, NM, and TX as yes) 
** with AZ and NM as no, and TX as yes 
*** with AZ, NM, and TX as no
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Table 20, continued 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.897 
R Square 0.805 
Adjusted R 
Square 0.575 
Standard Error 0.026 
Observations 25.000 
 
 
The same set of analyses for fourth-grade math was calculated based on data 
disaggregated by ethnicity.  Table 21 displays all correlations among PRI, demographic 
variables, and fourth-grade achievement indicators.  
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Table 21:  Correlations of Fourth-Grade Math Changes in Percent Proficiency 
(1996-2000) and Disaggregated by Ethnicity 
  
A B C D E F G H I 
A: PRI 1.000         
B: Proportion 
African American 
and Hispanic  1995 
0.675 1.000        
C: 1995 Census 
Estimates 0.357 0.519 1.000       
D: Average per 
pupil revenue 
1990-1991 
-0.191 -0.126 0.143 1.000      
E: Proportion of 
1995 revenues 
coming from state 
(not local or 
federal) 
-0.146 -0.161 -0.242 -0.411 1.000     
F: Change in 
proportion of 
African 
American/Hispanic 
students 1996-2000 
-0.046 0.168 0.094 0.133 -0.071 1.000    
G: Change in 
percent at or above 
basic 1996-2000 
White 
0.184 0.322 0.134 -0.013 -0.340 0.042 1.000   
H: Change in 
percent at or above 
basic 1996-2000 
Hispanic 
0.281 0.497 0.187 -0.046 0.055 0.141 0.512 1.000  
I: Change in 
percent at or above 
basic 1996-2000 
African American 
0.327 0.117 0.273 0.105 -0.467 0.075 0.430 0.167 1.000 
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All correlations are positive but relatively weak for change in percent scoring at basic and 
above and PRI for White and Hispanic students.  But the correlation for African 
American students is somewhat stronger.   
Two scatter plots (Figures 5 and 6) of the relationship between PRI and changes 
in percent basic among Hispanic and African American students reveal two significant 
outliers.  Correlations were computed eliminating these outliers changing the correlation 
between PRI and percent at or above basic among Hispanic students to .196 (after 
eliminating Maine) and to .713 among African American students after eliminating New 
Mexico. 
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Figure 5: Scatter Plot of Change in the Percent of Fourth-Grade Students At or 
Above Basic and PRI: African American Students 
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Figure 6:  Scatter Plot of Change in the Percent of Fourth-Grade Students At Basic 
or Above and PRI: Hispanic Students 
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Replication of Carnoy and Loeb’s Equation Three  
We did not have the exact estimates of retention and progression rates calculated 
by Carnoy and Loeb.  However, we adopted their procedures for calculating progression.  
Using enrollment data59 we estimated progression in terms of (a) the ratio of the number 
of students in ninth grade in year i related to the number in eighth grade in year i -1 for 
the ninth-grade progression rate, (b) the ratio of the number of students in 12th grade in 
year i related to the number in 10th grade in year i -2 for the 10th-12th grade progression 
rate, and (c) the ratio of the number of 12th grade students in year i related to the number 
of students in eighth-grade in year i-4 for the high school progression rate.  
As shown in Table 22, high-stakes testing pressure is positively correlated with 
the probability that students progress from eighth- to ninth-grade.  Interestingly, in spite 
of relatively strong correlations in prior years, the relationship for the most recent years 
where enrollment data is available is relatively weak (i.e., 2000-2001).  By stark contrast, 
the relationships between PRI and eighth- and 10th-grade progression into 12th-grade 
were all negative.  
 
Table 22: Correlation of Eighth-Ninth-Grade Progression Rates and PRI 
8th-9th 10th-12th 8th-12th 
1993-1994 .424 1993-1995 -.513 1993-1997 -.434 
1994-1995 .499 1994-1996 -.438 1994-1998 -.442 
1995-1996 .446 1995-1997 -.443 1995-1999 -.411 
1996-1997 .462 1996-1998 -.401 1996-2000 -.353 
1997-1998 .365 1998-2000 -.342 1997-2001 -.386 
1998-1999 .416 1999-2001  -.331   
1999-2000 .415     
2000-2001 .188     
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Part II: Relationship of Change in PRI and Change in NAEP 
Achievement 
 We conducted a series of correlations and partial correlations to examine the 
relationship between NAEP gains (between first administration and the most recent one) 
first administration and the most recent one) and pressure rating index change (across the 
same years).  Table 23 displays all correlations by grade level and disaggregated by 
ethnicity for fourth- and eighth-grade math and reading (A complete set of scatter plots, 
correlations and partial correlations for all years, grades, and subject areas aggregated at 
the state level and disaggregated by student ethnicity is available in Appendix E).  
Page 73 of 336 
This document is available on the Great Lakes Center website at: http://www.greatlakescenter.org 
 
 
Table 23: Correlations and Partial Correlations of NAEP Gain and Threat Rating 
Change 
 MATH READING 
 Grade 4* Grade 8** Grade 4* Grade 8*** 
r for all students .370 .283 .187 .170 
Partial r for all students .343 .280 .157 .198 
r for African American 
students .194 .330 -.060 .109 
Partial r for African American 
students .161 .315 -.077 .081 
r for Hispanic students .383 .112 -.007 .243 
Partial r for Hispanic students .370 .077 .024 .251 
r for White students .254 -.106 .159 .264 
Partial r for White students .244 -.098 .136 .217 
Note: Partial r is same correlation holding 2003 NAEP exclusion rates constant. 
* Based on NAEP gain scores and threat rating change calculated as 2003 data – 1992 data. 
**Based on NAEP gain scores and threat rating change calculated as 2003 data – 1990 data. 
***Based on NAEP gain scores and threat rating change calculated as 2003 data – 1998 data. 
 
 
Fourth-Grade Math 
 
 Looking at the change between 1992 and 2003 and aggregated across all students, 
the relationship between NAEP gain and the increase in high-stakes testing pressure is 
moderately high; however, when the data are disaggregated by ethnicity, it can be seen 
that this relationship is primarily explained by Hispanic and White student gains.  The 
relationship between pressure and achievement change among African American students 
is weak.  A series of scatter plots reveals that among White students, a potential outlier 
may be influencing the strength of the correlation (see Figure 7).  A correlation 
eliminating North Carolina (with a NAEP 1992-2003 gain of 29 points) yielded an even 
lower relationship (.174) between NAEP gain and threat change among White students.   
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Figure7:  Scatter Plot of Fourth-Grade Math NAEP Gain and Threat Rating 
Change: White Students 
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Eighth-Grade Math 
 Across all students, there is a positive but moderate relationship between eighth-
grade math gains and threat rating change (1990-2003).  A scatter plot of the overall 
relationship of NAEP gain and threat change reveals a potential outlier (again, North 
Carolina) (see Figure 8).  A follow-up correlation eliminating North Carolina from the 
equation changes the relationship only slightly (from r = .283 to r = .268).  
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Figure 8:  Scatter Plot of Eighth-Grade Math NAEP Gain and Threat Rating 
Change: All Students 
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When disaggregated by student achievement, it can be seen that the relationship among 
achievement and pressure is virtually non existent for Hispanic and White students, but 
moderately strong for African American students.  A scatter plot of the correlation among 
white students also reveals two outliers (see Figure 9).  A correlation eliminating these 
two outliers (Hawaii and Missouri) change the relationship from r = -.106 to r = .269.  
There are no conspicuous outliers for the Hispanic or African American student data (see 
Appendix E).  
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Figure 9:  Scatter Plot of Eighth-Grade Math NAEP Gain and Threat Rating 
Change: White Students 
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Reading   
 Correlations between NAEP gain and change in pressure for fourth- and eighth-
grade reading are all relatively weak.  A series of scatter plots also reveal no obvious 
outliers (see Appendix E).  
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Part III: Relationship of Change in PRI and Change in NAEP 
Achievement for “Cohorts” of Students  
We wanted to see if changes in high-stakes testing pressure were related to 
changes in achievement among cohorts of students.  Table 24 presents these results for 
math and Table 25 displays them for reading.   
 
Table 24:  Correlations of Cohort Achievement Gains and PRI Change: Math 
  1992 
fourth-
grade 
NAEP* 
1996 
eighth- 
grade 
NAEP*
Cohort 
change 
(1992-
1996) 
1992-
1996 
PRI 
change
1996 
fourth-
grade 
NAEP*
2000 
eighth-
grade 
NAEP* 
Cohort 
change 
(1996-
2000) 
1996-
2000 
PRI 
change 
1992 fourth-grade 
NAEP*  1.000        
1996 eighth-grade 
NAEP*  0.960 1.000       
Cohort change (1992-
1996) 0.230 0.493 1.000      
1992-1996 PRI 
change -0.166 -0.111 0.131 1.000     
1996 fourth-grade 
NAEP*  0.893 0.918 0.419 0.095 1.000    
2000 eighth-grade 
NAEP*  0.877 0.918 0.466 0.057 0.916 1.000   
Cohort change (1996-
2000) 0.308 0.355 0.278 -0.058 0.182 0.561 1.000  
1996-2000 PRI 
change -0.197 -0.205 -0.102 -0.133 -0.116 -0.109 -0.028 1.000 
* Denotes no accommodations. 
 
Correlations between cohort achievement gains in math and threat changes are displayed 
in bold in Table 24 and reflect a weak but positive relationship for the 1992-1996 cohort, 
and an even weaker but negative relationship for the 1994-1998 cohort.   
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Table 25: Correlations of Cohort Achievement Gains and PRI Change: Reading 
  1994 
fourth-
grade 
reading 
NAEP* 
1998 
eighth-
grade 
reading 
NAEP*
Cohort 
NAEP 
gain 
1994-
1998 
PRI 
change 
1994-
1998 
1998 
fourth-
grade 
reading 
NAEP 
2002 
eighth-
grade 
reading 
NAEP 
Cohort 
NAEP 
gain 
1998-
2002 
PRI 
change 
1998-
2002 
1994 fourth-grade 
reading NAEP* 1.000        
1998 eighth-grade 
reading NAEP* 0.885 1.000       
Cohort NAEP gain 
1994-1998 -0.676 -0.255 1.000      
PRI change 1994-
1998 0.126 0.069 -0.152 1.000     
1998 fourth-grade 
reading NAEP  0.932 0.914 -0.489 0.059 1.000    
2002 eighth-grade 
reading NAEP 0.861 0.882 -0.391 0.107 0.869 1.000   
Cohort NAEP gain 
1998-2002 -0.535 -0.465 0.374 0.046 -0.656 -0.196 1.000  
PRI change 1998-
2002 -0.158 -0.026 0.286 -0.121 -0.109 -0.021 0.184 1.000 
* Denotes no accommodations. 
 
Correlations between cohort achievement gains in reading and threat changes are 
displayed in bold (Table 25) and reflect a weak but positive relationship for the 1998-
2002 cohort, and a weak but negative relationship for the 1994-1998 cohort.  
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Part IV: Antecedent-Consequent Relationships Between Change in PRI 
 and Change in NAEP Achievement 
In our last set of analyses, we attempt to move closer to warranted conclusions 
about any causal relationship between high-stakes testing pressure and academic 
achievement.  In these analyses we adopt a design that involves the correlation of 
changes in the PRI index with subsequent changes in NAEP scale score achievement 
changes.  Since causes must precede their effects, the lack of any correlation of PRI 
change with NAEP change would significantly embarrass any claim of a causal link.  
Moreover, any form of regression analysis that ignores changes in putative causal 
variables and ignores time sequences of putative causes and effects is vulnerable to 
alternative explanations.  For example, high PRI states may also be poor in ways not 
accounted for by the other variables entered into the regression equation.  However, 
correlations with changes in the PRI index are far less confounded by unaccounted for 
“third variables.”  The combination of correlating the differences in measures of the 
putative causes and effect and staggering these differenced variables so that the cause is 
measured before the effect has a tradition in the literature of econometrics, where it is 
related to what is known as “Granger causality”—after Clive W. J. Granger60 who was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2003—and has been applied with some success 
in the study of alcohol consumption and liver cirrhosis death61 and the study of the 
economy and suicide deaths.62  
First, we present a series of correlations between antecedent PRI change and 
subsequent NAEP scale score gains (non-cohort and across fourth- and eighth-grade math 
and reading overall and disaggregated by student ethnicity).  Second, we examine the 
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same patterns but using cohort NAEP score gains.  To illustrate our strategy, we focus on 
fourth-grade math.  We began by identifying NAEP years of administration (for fourth-
grade math they are 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2003).  NAEP gains are then calculated for 
the following years: 1992-1996 (calculated as the difference of 1996 NAEP scale score 
and 1992 NAEP scale score), 1996-2000 and 2000-2003.  Once these gain years were 
identified, we calculated corresponding antecedent PRI changes.  For example, for NAEP 
gains of 1992-1996, PRI change was calculated across the previous four years of 1988-
1992.  Similarly, for NAEP gains of 1996-2000, we calculated the corresponding PRI 
change for the previous four years of 1992-1996.  Lastly, for the NAEP gain of 2000-
2003 we calculated the corresponding antecedent PRI change of the previous three years 
of 1997-2000.63   
Cross-Sectional Causal Analyses 
Our first set of causal analyses for fourth-grade math is presented in Table 26.  All 
correlations between NAEP gain and previous pressure change are virtually nonexistent 
(see Table 27).  Furthermore, a series of partial correlations holding exclusion rates 
constant do not change the nature of this outcome.  Thus, for fourth-grade math 
achievement, the relationship between previous pressure increase and later NAEP 
achievement change is nonexistent.  
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Table 26: Correlations of PRI Change and NAEP Gains Across 1992-2003:  Fourth-Grade Math—Non-Cohort 
  
PRI 
Change 
1988-
1992 
NAEP 
Gain 
1992-
1996 
% 
Excluded 
1996****
PRI 
Change 
1992-
1996 
NAEP 
Gain 
1996-
2000 
% 
Excluded 
2000 
PRI 
Change 
1996-
2000 
NAEP 
Gain 
2000-
2003 
% 
Excluded 
2003 
PRI Change 1988-
1992 1.000         
NAEP Gain 1992-
1996 -0.066* 1.000        
% Excluded 
1996**** 0.098 0.047 1.000       
PRI Change 1992-
1996 -0.328 0.565 -0.048 1.000      
NAEP Gain 1996-
2000 0.247 0.038 -0.019 0.159** 1.000     
% Excluded 2000 0.053 0.319 0.602 0.160 0.149 1.000    
PRI Change 1996-
2000 0.325 0.190 0.098 -0.151 0.112 0.137 1.000   
NAEP Gain 2000-
2003 0.063 -0.297 0.081 0.060 0.124 -0.274 0.142*** 1.000  
% Excluded 2003 0.212 0.336 0.237 0.150 0.092 0.463 0.246 0.028 1.000 
Partial correlation results:  *  -.072;   ** .138;   *** .140 
**** Denotes no accommodations. 
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The same set of analyses disaggregating the data by student ethnicity is calculated 
(see Table 27).  As can be seen, earlier pressure changes are not related to achievement 
changes for African American, Hispanic or White students earlier in the 1990s.  
However, as the decade progresses, the relationship between antecedent pressure 
increases and later achievement gains strengthens.  Specifically, for all subgroups, 
pressure change in the later half of the 1990s is strongly associated with most recent 
2000-2003 NAEP gains. 
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Table 27: Correlations of PRI Change and NAEP Gains Across 1992-2003 by Student Ethnicity: Fourth-Grade Math—
Non-Cohort 
  
A B C D E F G H I J K L 
A:  PRI Change 
1988-1992 1.000            
B:  NAEP Gain 
1992-1996* African 
American 
-0.087 1.000           
C:  NAEP Gain 
1992-1996* 
Hispanic 
0.250 0.226 1.000          
D:  NAEP Gain 
1992-1996* White 0.000 0.361 0.412 1.000         
E:  PRI Change 
1992-1996 0.042 0.440 0.539 0.906 1.000        
F:  NAEP Gain 
1996-2000* African 
American 
-0.151 0.350 0.048 0.247 0.427 1.000       
G:  NAEP Gain 
1996-2000* 
Hispanic  
-0.271 0.379 -0.427 0.131 0.182 0.368 1.000      
H:  NAEP Gain 
1996-2000* White -0.090 0.319 -0.134 -0.362 -0.159 0.436 0.306 1.000     
I:  PRI Change 
1996-2000 -0.031 -0.180 -0.233 -0.409 -0.436 -0.268 0.258 0.130 1.000    
J:  NAEP Gain 
2000-2003 African 
American 
-0.013 0.242 0.293 0.107 0.187 0.001 0.224 0.316 0.374 1.000   
K:  NAEP Gain 
2000-2003 Hispanic 0.084 0.076 0.053 -0.138 -0.135 -0.243 -0.098 0.306 0.418 0.423 1.000  
L:  NAEP Gain 
2000-2003 White -0.090 0.005 -0.153 -0.360 -0.228 -0.049 0.362 0.287 0.730 0.278 0.216 1.000 
* Denotes no accommodations. 
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In our next set of analyses, the relationship between pressure change and NAEP 
gain for eighth-grade math achievement is examined.  As can be seen in Table 28, there is 
a moderate and positive relationship between earlier pressure change and later NAEP 
gain for the years 1990-1992 and 1996-2000 and a weak, but positive one for the years of 
2000-2003.  By contrast, there is a moderate but negative relationship between pressure 
change and NAEP gain for the 1992-1996 year.  Corresponding partial correlations do 
not change this outcome significantly. 
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Table 28: Correlations of PRI Change and NAEP Gains 1990-2003 All Students:  Eighth-Grade Math—Non-Cohort  
 A B C D E F G H I J K L 
A:  PRI 
Change 1988-
1990 
1.000            
B:  NAEP 
Gain 1990-
1992***** 
0.223* 1.000           
C:  % 
Excluded 
1992  
0.199 0.027 1.000          
D:  PRI 
Change 1988-
1990 
0.464 -0.010 -0.058 1.000         
E:  NAEP 
Gain 1992-
1996***** 
-0.209 0.248 -0.008 -0.297** 1.000        
F:  % 
Excluded 
1996 
0.245 0.111 0.699 0.087 -0.010 1.000       
G:  PRI 
Change 1992-
1996 
-0.201 -0.004 -0.034 -0.328 0.621 -0.033 1.000      
H:  NAEP 
Gain 1996-
2000***** 
0.193 0.381 -0.066 0.241 0.359 -0.077 0.411*** 1.000     
I:  % 
Excluded 
2000 
0.073 0.534 0.253 -0.240 0.449 0.418 0.317 0.378 1.000    
J:  PRI 
Change 1997-
2000 
0.426 0.011 0.437 0.384 -0.099 0.217 -0.085 0.247 0.101 1.000   
K:  NAEP 
Gain 2000-
2003** 
0.132 -0.332 0.103 0.267 -0.582 -0.180 -0.118 -0.114 -0.453 0.195**** 1.000  
L:  % 
Excluded 
2003 
-0.008 -0.382 -0.507 0.006 0.107 -0.325 0.256 0.020 -0.129 -0.365 0.157 1.000 
Partial correlations:  * = .222;  ** = .299;  *** = .331;  **** = .26 
Page 86 of 336 
This document is available on the Great Lakes Center website at: http://www.greatlakescenter.org 
 
 
***** Denotes no accommodations.  
 
Page 87 of 336 
This document is available on the Great Lakes Center website at: http://www.greatlakescenter.org 
 
 
A series of correlations between pressure change and eighth-grade math gains by 
student ethnicity are presented in Table 29.  Across all years, there is no relationship 
between pressure and African American student NAEP score gains.  Among Hispanic 
students, pressure has no bearing on subsequent achievement in the early 1990s (1990-
1992) or in the most recent round of NAEP testing (2000-2003).  By contrast, there is a 
moderate but positive relationship between pressure and NAEP gains for the years 1992-
1996 and 1996-2000.  Among White students, pressure and NAEP change are 
inconsistently related.  For the years 1992-1996 and 2000-2003 there is a weak but 
negative relationship between pressure and NAEP gains.  By contrast for remaining years 
of 1990-1992 and 1996-2000 there is a moderate but positive relationship.   
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Table 29: Correlations of PRI Change and NAEP Gains by Student Ethnicity: Eighth-Grade Math—Non-Cohort 
  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
A:  PRI Change 1988-
1990 1.000                
B:  NAEP Gain 1990-
1992* African 
American 
0.161 1.000               
C:  NAEP Gain 1990-
1992* Hispanic 0.161 0.317 1.000              
D:  NAEP Gain 1990-
1992* White 0.300 0.462 0.550 1.000             
E:  PRI Change 1988-
1992 0.464 0.105 0.087 0.058 1.000            
F:  NAEP Gain 1992-
1996* African 
American 
-0.056 -0.011 0.140 0.033 -0.114 1.000           
G:  NAEP Gain 1992-
1996* Hispanic -0.275 0.313 0.158 0.154 0.245 0.090 1.000          
H:  NAEP Gain 1992-
1996* White -0.271 0.183 0.347 0.066 -0.176 0.086 0.426 1.000         
I:  PRI Change 1992-
1996 -0.201 0.121 0.259 -0.085 -0.328 0.305 0.158 0.489 1.000        
J:  NAEP Gain 1996-
2000* African 
American 
0.130 -0.040 0.241 0.330 0.102 -0.655 -0.012 0.136 -0.021 1.000       
K:  NAEP Gain 1996-
2000* Hispanic 0.285 0.211 0.303 0.282 -0.049 0.387 0.041 0.344 0.314 0.166 1.000      
L:  NAEP Gain 1996-
2000* White 0.118 0.404 0.561 0.440 0.231 0.073 0.367 0.193 0.334 0.354 0.421 1.000     
M:  PRI Change 1997-
2000 0.426 0.011 -0.053 0.101 0.384 0.154 0.011 -0.266 -0.085 0.155 0.272 0.221 1.000    
N:  NAEP Gain 2000-
2003 African 
American 
0.212 0.286 0.186 0.128 0.340 0.336 0.331 -0.065 0.152 -0.335 0.157 0.403 -0.004 1.000   
O:  NAEP Gain 2000-
2003 Hispanic -0.146 -0.260 -0.292 -0.409 0.000 0.106 -0.232 -0.249 -0.186 -0.303 -0.313 -0.293 -0.085 0.025 1.000  
Page 89 of 336 
This document is available on the Great Lakes Center website at: http://www.greatlakescenter.org 
 
 
P:  NAEP Gain 2000-
2003 White  -0.159 -0.234 -0.150 -0.376 -0.198 0.095 -0.106 -0.111 0.024 -0.167 -0.224 -0.157 -0.154 -0.139 0.685 1.000 
* Denotes no accommodations.
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In our next set of analyses, pressure and NAEP gains for fourth-grade reading 
achievement are analyzed (Table 30).  Again, data suggest an inconsistent effect of 
pressure on later achievement.  For example, there is a moderate relationship between 
pressure change and NAEP gain in the early to mid-1990s, but in one case it is a negative 
relationship (1992-1994) and in the other it is positive (1994-1998).  In later years, there 
is no relationship between changes in high-stakes testing pressure and subsequent NAEP 
achievement gains.  
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Table 30: Correlations of PRI Change and NAEP Gains 1992-2003 Fourth-Grade Reading 
  
A B C D E F G H I J K L 
A: PRI Change 
1990-1992 1.000            
B: NAEP Gain 
1992-1994***** -0.313* 1.000           
C: % Excluded 
1994 -0.194 -0.180 1.000          
D:  PRI Change 
1990-1994 0.879 -0.161 -0.130 1.000         
E: NAEP Gain 
1994-1998* 0.159 -0.322 0.276 0.143** 1.000        
F: % Excluded 
1998 -0.002 -0.320 0.668 -0.065 0.713 1.000       
G:  PRI Change 
1994-1998 -0.192 0.142 -0.149 -0.292 -0.128 -0.043 1.000      
H:  NAEP Gain 
1998-2002 0.198 -0.453 -0.026 0.184 0.035 -0.021 0.021*** 1.000     
I: % Excluded 
2002 -0.086 -0.265 0.178 -0.080 0.235 0.468 0.096 0.359 1.000    
J:  PRI Change 
1994-1998 -0.192 0.142 -0.149 -0.292 -0.128 -0.043 1.000 0.021 0.096 1.000   
K: NAEP Gain 
1998-2003 0.123 -0.405 -0.124 0.144 0.085 -0.073 0.125 0.786 0.266 0.125**** 1.000  
L: % Excluded 
2003 -0.223 -0.269 0.352 -0.143 0.330 0.431 -0.001 0.114 0.772 -0.001 0.163 1.000 
Partial correlations:  * = .361;  ** = .270;  *** =.014;    **** = .127 
***** Denotes no accommodations. 
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We followed up these analyses looking at fourth-grade reading trends with earlier 
pressure and disaggregated by student ethnicity (see Table 31).  Our results reveal no 
consistent pattern in the effect of pressure on achievement.  Among African American 
students, NAEP gains in the early 1990s and antecedent pressure change are strongly but 
negatively associated (1992-1994).  But over time, the relationship between pressure and 
achievement is virtually nonexistent.  Similarly, there is no consistent pattern of 
relationships between pressure and achievement change among Hispanic or White 
students.  In fact, most of the relationships are virtually nonexistent with the exception of  
pressure change and 1998-2002 NAEP gain among Hispanic students (which is negative,  
-.303) and 1998-2003 NAEP gain among White students (.280). 
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Table 31: Correlations of PRI Change and NAEP Gains by Student Ethnicity: Fourth-Grade Reading—Non-Cohort 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
A: PRI Change 1990-
1992 1.000                
B: NAEP Gain 1992-
1994* African 
American 
-0.378 1.000               
C: NAEP Gain 1992-
1994* Hispanic 0.118 0.155 1.000              
D: NAEP Gain 1992-
1994* White -0.047 0.051 0.158 1.000             
E: PRI Change 1990-
1994 0.879 -0.348 0.059 0.013 1.000            
F: NAEP Gain 1994-
1998* African 
American 
0.139 -0.571 -0.362 0.201 0.132 1.000           
G: NAEP Gain 1994-
1998* Hispanic -0.039 -0.245 -0.576 0.242 0.059 0.468 1.000          
H: NAEP Gain 1994-
1998* White 0.141 -0.335 -0.020 -0.064 0.044 0.255 0.189 1.000         
I: PRI Change 1994-
1998 -0.192 0.104 0.010 0.086 -0.292 -0.164 -0.178 -0.170 1.000        
J: NAEP Gain 1998-
2002 African 
American 
0.242 -0.156 0.235 -0.023 0.267 -0.121 0.044 0.354 0.082 1.000       
K: NAEP Gain 1998-
2002 Hispanic -0.272 0.147 -0.044 -0.046 -0.297 -0.014 -0.109 0.053 -0.303 0.175 1.000      
L: NAEP Gain 1998-
2002 White 0.008 -0.228 -0.070 -0.212 0.083 0.094 -0.024 -0.117 0.119 0.599 0.173 1.000     
M: PRI Change 1994-
1998 -0.192 0.104 0.010 0.086 -0.292 -0.164 -0.178 -0.170 1.000 0.082 -0.303 0.119 1.000    
N: NAEP Gain 1998-
2003 African 
American 
0.198 -0.303 0.318 -0.012 0.320 -0.043 -0.134 0.299 0.013 0.760 0.030 0.464 0.013 1.000   
O: NAEP Gain 1998-
2003 Hispanic -0.261 0.165 -0.028 -0.027 -0.296 -0.091 -0.110 -0.029 -0.113 0.133 0.810 0.205 -0.113 -0.008 1.000  
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P: NAEP Gain 1998-
2003 White 0.128 -0.174 0.054 -0.230 0.174 0.137 -0.129 -0.140 0.280 0.353 -0.252 0.742 0.280 0.406 -0.060 1.000 
* Denotes no accommodations. 
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Lastly, patterns in antecedent pressure changes and subsequent NAEP change for 
eighth-grade reading achievement are examined (see Table 32).  There is no evidence of 
a relationship between pressure and achievement for eighth-grade reading on average or 
when data are disaggregated by student ethnicity (see Table 33).  
 
Table 32: Correlations of PRI Change and NAEP Gains Across 1992-2003 Eighth-
Grade Reading—Non-Cohort 
  
PRI 
Change 
1994-1998 
NAEP 
Gain 
1998-2002
% 
Excluded 
2002 
PRI 
Change 
1993-1998 
NAEP 
Gain 
1998-2003 
% 
Excluded 
2003 
PRI Change 
1994-1998 1.000      
NAEP Gain 
1998-2002 0.085* 1.000     
% Excluded 
2002 -0.013 0.292 1.000    
PRI Change 
1993-1998 0.849 0.202 -0.020 1.000   
NAEP Gain 
1998-2003 0.008 0.838 0.002 0.102** 1.000  
% Excluded 
2003 0.161 0.220 0.821 0.168 -0.066 1.000 
Partial correlation: * = .093;  ** = .115 
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Table 33: Correlations of PRI Change and NAEP Gains by Student Ethnicity: Eighth-
Grade Reading—Non-Cohort 
  
PRI 
Change 
1994-
1998 
NAEP 
Gain 
1998-
2002 
African 
American 
NAEP 
Gain 
1998-
2002 
Hispanic
NAEP 
Gain 
1998-
2002 
White 
% 
Excluded 
2002 
PRI 
Change 
1993-
1998 
NAEP 
Gain 
1998-
2003 
African 
American
NAEP 
Gain 
1998-
2003 
Hispanic 
NAEP 
Gain 
1998-
2003 
White 
% 
Excluded 
2003 
PRI Change 
1994-1998 1.000          
NAEP Gain 
1998-2002 
African 
American  
0.038 1.000         
NAEP Gain 
1998-2002 
Hispanic  
0.149 0.302 1.000        
NAEP Gain 
1998-2002 
White  
0.077 0.317 0.146 1.000       
% Excluded 
2002 -0.013 -0.030 0.220 0.384 1.000      
PRI Change 
1993-1998 0.849 0.092 0.167 0.241 -0.020 1.000     
NAEP Gain 
1998-2003 
African 
American  
-0.168 0.367 0.036 0.364 -0.047 0.003 1.000    
NAEP Gain 
1998-2003 
Hispanic  
0.176 0.193 0.935 0.180 0.131 0.157 0.000 1.000   
NAEP Gain 
1998-2003 
White 
0.109 0.346 0.194 0.701 0.342 0.123 0.100 0.280 1.000  
% Excluded 
2003 0.161 -0.024 0.170 0.234 0.821 0.168 -0.120 0.011 0.208 1.000 
 
Cohort Causal Analyses 
In this last section, we present a series of correlations between antecedent changes 
in pressure associated with high-stakes testing and subsequent NAEP gains by student 
cohorts (i.e., “cohort” analyses follow the achievement trends of students as they progress 
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from fourth to eighth grade64).  For these analyses, cohort NAEP gains are calculated as: 
[eighth-grade achievement year i] – [fourth-grade achievement year (i - 4)].  Table 34 
presents the results for math.  As can be seen there is a strong and negative relationship 
between 1988-1992 PRI change and 1992-1996 cohort achievement gain.  Subsequently, 
there is no relationship between pressure (1992-1996) and cohort change (1996-2000).   
Table 34: Correlations of PRI Change and Cohort Math NAEP Gains 
  
PRI 
Change 
1988-1992 
NAEP 
Cohort 
Change 
1992-1996 
% 
Excluded 
1996 
Eighth-
Grade 
Math 
PRI 
Change 
1992-1996 
NAEP 
Cohort 
Change 
1996-2000 
% 
Excluded 
2000 
Eighth-
Grade 
Math 
PRI Change 1988-
1992 1.000      
NAEP Cohort 
Change 1992-1996 -0.369* 1.000     
% Excluded 1996 
Eighth-Grade Math 0.087 0.131 1.000    
PRI Change 1992-
1996 -0.328 0.131 -0.033 1.000   
NAEP Cohort 
Change 1996-2000 0.046 0.278 -0.087 -0.058** 1.000  
% Excluded 2000 
Eighth-Grade Math  -0.240 0.446 0.418 0.317 0.356 1.000 
Partial correlations: * = -.385;  ** = -.193 
 
Follow-up analyses of these relationships and by student ethnicity are presented in Table 
35.  Results suggest there is no relationship between pressure and math achievement for 
Hispanic and White students and only a very moderate one for African American 
students.  
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Table 35: Correlations of PRI Change and Cohort Math NAEP Gains by Student Ethnicity 
  A B C D E F G H I J 
A: PRI Change 
1988-1992 1.000          
B: NAEP Cohort 
Change 1992-1996 
African American  
0.214 1.000         
C: NAEP Cohort 
Change 1992-1996 
Hispanic 
0.193 0.434 1.000        
D: NAEP Cohort 
Change 1992-1996 
White  
0.130 0.166 0.211 1.000       
E: % Excluded 
1996 Eighth-
Grade Math  
0.087 0.510 0.293 0.163 1.000      
F: PRI Change 
1992-1996 -0.328 0.297 0.018 -0.035 -0.033 1.000     
G: NAEP Cohort 
Change 1996-2000 
African American 
0.256 0.918 0.296 0.218 0.417 0.213 1.000    
H: NAEP Cohort 
Change 1996-2000 
Hispanic 
0.190 0.574 0.827 0.383 0.320 0.126 0.434 1.000   
I: NAEP Cohort 
Change 1996-2000 
White  
0.235 0.242 0.249 0.947 0.124 -0.065 0.307 0.445 1.000  
J: % Excluded 
2000 Eighth-
Grade Math  
-0.240 0.312 0.156 0.187 0.418 0.317 0.332 0.303 0.185 1.000 
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PRI change and cohort trends for reading achievement are presented in Table 36. 
There is no relationship between pressure and reading gains.  Similarly, follow-up 
analyses by student ethnicity (Table 37) reveal no consistent pattern of effect of pressure 
on achievement.   
 
Table 36: Correlations of PRI Change and Cohort Reading NAEP Gains 
  
PRI 
Change 
1990-1994 
Cohort 
NAEP 
Change 
1994-1998 
% 
Excluded 
1998  
PRI 
Change 
1994-1998 
NAEP 
Cohort 
Change 
1998-2002 
% 
Excluded 
2002 
PRI Change 
1990-1994 1.000      
Cohort NAEP 
Change 1994-
1998 
0.104* 1.000     
% Excluded 
1998  0.047 0.667 1.000    
PRI Change 
1994-1998 -0.292 -0.152 -0.002 1.000   
NAEP Cohort 
Change 1998-
2002 
0.355 0.374 0.248 0.046** 1.000  
% Excluded 
2002 0.081 0.387 0.621 0.076 0.490 1.000 
Partial correlations:  * = .098; ** = .010
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Table 37: Correlations of PRI Change and Cohort Reading NAEP Gains by Student 
Ethnicity 
  
PRI 
Change 
1990-
1994 
Cohort 
NAEP 
Change 
1994-
1998 
African 
American 
Cohort 
NAEP 
Change 
1994-
1998 
Hispanic
Cohort 
NAEP 
Change 
1994-
1998 
White 
PRI 
Change 
1994-
1998 
NAEP 
Cohort 
Change 
1998-
2002 
African 
American 
NAEP 
Cohort 
Change 
1998-
2002 
Hispanic 
NAEP 
Cohort 
Change 
1998-
2002 
White 
PRI 
Change 
1990-1994 
1.000        
Cohort 
NAEP 
Change 
1994-1998 
African 
American 
0.269 1.000       
Cohort 
NAEP 
Change 
1994-1998 
Hispanic 
-0.295 -0.017 1.000      
Cohort 
NAEP 
Change 
1994-1998 
White 
-0.099 0.212 0.145 1.000     
PRI 
Change 
1994-1998 
-0.292 0.150 -0.184 -0.143 1.000    
NAEP 
Cohort 
Change 
1998-2002 
African 
American 
0.297 0.859 -0.212 0.279 0.092 1.000   
NAEP 
Cohort 
Change 
1998-2002 
Hispanic 
-0.357 -0.158 0.814 0.191 -0.242 -0.141 1.000  
NAEP 
Cohort 
Change 
1998-2002 
White 
0.286 0.170 -0.410 0.234 0.113 0.366 -0.246 1.000 
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Discussion 
Replication of Carnoy and Loeb 
Some of our findings replicate those reported by Carnoy and Loeb.  For example, 
when our rating system was substitute for theirs, there was a strong association between 
state composition and population, and pressure associated with accountability.  It seems 
relatively clear that larger states and those with a greater proportion of minority students 
tend to implement accountability systems that exert a greater level of pressure.  But, 
when Carnoy and Loeb examined the relationship of students’ National Assessment of 
Education Progress (NAEP) test performance from the early 1990s with the strength of 
accountability implementation later, their only significant finding was the negative 
association between fourth-grade White students’ math performance and later 
accountability implementation.  By contrast, our analysis revealed a positive relationship 
between earlier African American student math achievement and pressure but a negative 
one between the change in the percent at or above basic in fourth-grade reading (1992-
1994) and pressure.     
In their second regression model, Carnoy and Loeb found that math gains were 
significantly associated with accountability strength—especially among eighth graders. 
Using our pressure rating index (PRI), there was a positive relationship between eighth-
grade NAEP gains and PRI; however, the strength of that relationship depended on the 
NAEP indicator and whether exclusion rates were partialed out of the correlation.  When 
the change in the percent of students achieving at or above basic and among all students 
(1996-2000) was the indicator, the correlation with PRI was significant and positive at 
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.446.  However, a partial correlation holding NAEP 2000 exclusion rates constant 
reduced this relationship to essentially zero:  .026.  By contrast, when NAEP scale scores 
were used, the relationship between achievement gains (again among all students, 1996-
2000) and our index of pressure was also positive, but slightly weaker at .372 (with a 
partial correlation of .351).  When disaggregated by ethnicity, the change in the percent 
of students at or above basic (1996-2000) and PRI is significant (.456) for Black students, 
but non-existent for White or Hispanic students.  Thus, among eighth graders, and 
especially among African American eighth-graders, pressure seems to be positively 
related to increases in achievement.  Among fourth graders, there was a positive 
relationship between change in percent at or above basic (1996-2000) math achievement 
and PRI among all students and when the data are disaggregated by ethnicity.  But, the 
strength of those relationships was lower than what was found for eighth grade (ranging 
from .184 - .327). 
These findings replicate what Carnoy and Loeb and others have found65—that 
pressure is related to increases in math NAEP performance later in the 1990s.  This 
finding emerges more strongly for eighth-grade math performance than it does for fourth-
grade performance, and for African American students than any other ethnic subgroup.  It 
is hard to draw any meaningful conclusions from these findings because they are 
correlational in nature.  Further, there is evidence that students are excluded at higher 
rates during post testing which raises questions as to the validity of academic “gain” 
scores. 
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Progression 
 It was surprising to find a positive correlation between our index of pressure and 
eighth-ninth-grade progression.  We would have predicted, as Carnoy and Loeb found, 
that pressure and eighth-ninth grade progression were unrelated.  Still, it was not 
surprising that consistent with what others have found,66 pressure is negatively associated 
with the likelihood that students will progress into 12th grade.  Thus, it may be that 
increasing pressure leads to greater numbers of students dropping out or being held back 
later in school.  However, this conclusion is drawn with caution because, as others have 
noted, 67 the use of enrollment figures as a proxy for grade progression does not account 
for enrollment changes due to migration or movement from school to school.  
PRI Change and NAEP Gains 
In our second set of analyses, a series of correlations were calculated to examine 
the pattern of relationships among NAEP gains and pressure change, both over the same 
time period and based on an antecedent-consequent design.  Our correlations of NAEP 
gains and PRI change across the same time period (1990-2003) across fourth- and eighth-
grade levels and for both math and reading in aggregate and disaggregated by student 
ethnicity (Table 22) revealed mostly positive but weak correlations (the largest positive 
correlation was .383).  But all correlations (among aggregated achievement scores) 
decreased when NAEP exclusion rates were held constant.  This set of analyses suggests 
that between the first administration of NAEP (state level) and the most recent, the 
corresponding change in pressure was only slightly related to math achievement gains 
and only for certain subgroups (e.g.,  fourth-grade Hispanic and eighth-grade African 
American student achievement).  But, by dramatic contrast pressure increases were 
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unrelated to reading gains at the fourth- or eighth-grade levels and among all ethnic 
student subgroups.  
Our strongest findings rest in the antecedent-consequent analyses.  The data 
summarized in Table 38 represent averaged instances of correlating antecedent PRI 
changes with subsequent NAEP scale score changes for both cohort and non-cohort 
analyses.  These averaged correlations suggest that previous increases in pressure do not 
cause later increases in achievement.  However, a review of the underlying constituent 
correlations represented in this table unmasks a subtle, but important, pattern.  In Table 
39, all possible antecedent-consequent correlations we found across each student ethnic 
subgroup are listed (from Tables 27, 29, 31, and 33).  Of particular note in Table 39 is the 
fact that for the four largest (in absolute value) correlations (see bolded entries at the 
bottom of the table) obtained in all the antecedent-consequent analyses, all four are for 
fourth-grade math, non-cohort analyses.  Moreover, three of these four correlations (.73, 
.42, .37) emanated from PRI changes that occurred during the last half of the 1990s.  If 
the four largest correlation coefficients are removed, the remaining 35 coefficients 
average 0.05 and are fairly evenly distributed around zero with a standard deviation of 
0.17, which is not far off of the standard error of correlations based on an n of 25 when 
the population value is zero.  
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Table 38: Antecedent—Consequent Relationships (Corr. Coeff) Between PRI 
Changes and NAEP Gains by Subject, Grade, Ethnicity, & Design (Non-Cohort vs. 
Cohort) 
 Non-Cohort Analysis Cohort Analysis (Grades 4-8) 
 Reading Math Reading Math 
     
African American 
Grade 4 .04 .24 .18 .21 
African American 
Grade 8 .02 .00 
      
Hispanic Grade 4 -.06 .30 -.27 .16 
Hispanic Grade 8 .15 .16   
     
White Grade 4 .10 .19 .07 .03 
White Grade 8 .10 .08 
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Table 39:  Antecedent—Consequent Change Correlations for Various Subjects, 
Ethnicities, and Grades: Non-Cohort Analyses 
-0.38 
-0.30 
-0.18 
-0.16 
-0.15 
-0.11 
-0.11 
-0.09 
-0.09 
-0.05 
-0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.06 
0.08 
0.08 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.13 
0.15 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.18 
0.25 
0.25 
0.28 
0.30 
0.31 
0.33 
0.37 
0.42 
0.43 
0.73 
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The pattern of these correlations speaks to the validity of the conclusion that we 
have indeed uncovered a causal link between high-stakes testing pressure and student 
achievement but only with respect to fourth-grade math, non-cohort trends.  The four 
strong correlations noted in Table 39 appear under the following circumstances:  Fourth-
grade math, non-cohort analysis.  It is significant that the strongest relationships were 
observed under these circumstances and not others (e.g., fourth- or eighth-grade reading, 
or even cohort analyses for fourth- or eighth-grade math).  The difference between a 
NAEP gain score for a cohort analysis vs. a non-cohort analysis is that in the former case, 
the achievement of students is tracked from grade 4 to grade 8 across intermediate 
grades math curricula.  In the latter case—non-cohort analysis—the achievement of one 
year’s grade 4 students is compared to a subsequent year’s grade 4 achievement on grade 
4 math curriculum (or more likely, grades 1-4 math curricula).  The math curriculum in 
the primary grades (1-4) is more standardized across the nation than the math curriculum 
in the intermediate and middle school grades (5-8).  Consequently, math achievement at 
these levels is more likely to be affected by drill and practice or teaching to a test because 
of the more “predictable” content.  
These findings, in combination with our replication analyses and what others have 
found,68 suggest that there is something about high-stakes testing that is related to math 
achievement—especially among fourth graders and particularly as accountability policies 
were enacted and enforced in the latter part of the 1990s and early 2000s.  But, it is just 
as notable that high-stakes pressure has no relation to reading achievement at either the 
fourth- or eighth-grade levels or for any student subgroup.  In the end, our findings (and 
lack of findings) lead us to the conclusion that high-stakes testing pressure might produce 
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effects only at the simplest level of the school curriculum: primary school arithmetic 
where achievement is most susceptible to being increased by drill and practice and 
teaching to the test.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
We recognize that our measurement of pressure, while innovative and 
comprehensive and an improvement over attempts made in previous research, is not 
without its limitations.  In spite of all our efforts to create portfolios that describe as 
comprehensively as possible all state-level assessment and accountability activities, we 
are aware that in creating these, we had a potential bias toward the more negative aspects 
of “accountability.”  This inclination potentially influenced the structure, content, and 
flow of the portfolio documentation.  Still, our approach was relatively robust for 
describing the rich variation of high-stakes testing implementation and impact. 
The use of newspaper documentation for describing cultural events raises many 
questions of potential selectivity bias.  In spite of our best efforts to minimize bias 
through a systematic news search and sampling process, the potential of news stories to 
assume a negative slant and to exaggerate stories they cover must be acknowledged.  
Still, by systematizing the sampling procedures for identifying stories to include in all 
portfolios, we hoped to eliminate, or at least dramatically reduce, between state 
differences in newspaper orientation (i.e., liberal versus conservative) and availability 
(Massachusetts had significantly more types of media covering educational 
accountability than a state such as Maine, for example).  Further, recognizing that 
newspapers tend to favor negative accounts, we made a concerted effort to include any 
positive coverage that existed in the corpus.   
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Our procedures for identifying state-level pressure over time, and therefore the 
threat rating difference estimates (i.e., PRI change), should be augmented by the 
judgments of a greater number of experts.  Although two judges conducted independent 
evaluations of a random selection of portfolios and compared their year-to-year pressure 
rating judgments, their rates of agreement across all years and all changes in pressure 
were moderate.  Nonetheless, the primary consequence of unreliable ratings was not 
observed, i.e., some non-zero correlations of PRI changes with NAEP gains were 
observed which would not have been the case had the PRI ratings over time by the two 
judges been of very low reliability.  In future studies, more work must be done to ensure 
agreement across all pressure ratings by state and year.  
  This study represents a significant contribution to the measurement of high-
stakes testing pressure.  Future studies could draw upon our characterizations to 
investigate the effects of pressure on other teacher/student outcomes.  For example, is 
pressure associated with increases in students’ antisocial behavior?  Students (and 
teachers) under increased pressure might be induced to vent their anxiety and frustration 
in undesirable ways.  This study represents a solid framework from which future students 
can examine the effects of pressure across a range of academic and social outcomes.  
In light of the rapidly growing body of evidence of the deleterious unintended 
effects of high-stakes testing, and the fact that our study finds no convincing evidence 
that the pressure associated with high-stakes testing leads to increased achievement, there 
is no reason to continue the practice of high stakes testing.  Thus, given (a) the 
unprofessional treatment of the educators who work in high-stakes testing situations, (b) 
the inevitable corruption of the  indicators used in accountability systems where high-
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stakes testing is featured, (c) data from this and other studies that seriously question 
whether the intended effects of high-stakes testing  actually occur, and (d) the 
acknowledged impossibility of reaching the achievement goals set by the NCLB act in a 
reasonable time frame, there is every reason to ask for a moratorium on testing policies 
that force us to rely on high-stakes testing.  
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